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Note
LET JUDGES JUDGE: ADVANCING A REVIEW
FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
SETTLEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANTS NEITHER ADMIT
NOR DENY ALLEGATIONS
GEORGE L. MILES

It has become increasingly common in the years following the
2008 financial crisis for the public to read news headlines of the
latest hundred million dollar settlements reached between the United
States federal government and major corporations wherein the
defendants do not admit or deny the charges alleged. This Note
analyzes why one agency in particular, the Securities and Exchange
Commission, has come to rely almost exclusively on these types of
settlements, and, through a close examination of a recent case on
appeal in the Second Circuit (SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets
Inc.), documents how the courts have struggled with allowing them
to be finalized due to the absence of sufficient factual support. It
concludes that further development of the existing standard for
judicial review is needed, and proposes a framework that would
increase transparency and accountability surrounding these types of
government settlements.
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LET JUDGES JUDGE: ADVANCING A REVIEW
FRAMEWORK FOR GOVERNMENT SECURITIES
SETTLEMENTS WHERE DEFENDANTS NEITHER ADMIT
NOR DENY ALLEGATIONS
GEORGE L. MILES*
I. INTRODUCTION
The history of the financial markets in the United States since the
outset of the twentieth century is a story of periodic, catastrophic failures,
starting with the Panic of 1907, through the Stock Market Crash of 1929,
to the financial crisis of 2008.1 In response to each crisis, the federal
government enacted new laws or created new regulatory and enforcement
agencies to better safeguard the public.2 One such agency, the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), arose out of the Great Depression with
a continuing mission to “protect investors, maintain fair, orderly, and
efficient markets, and facilitate capital formation.”3
While the SEC can point to numerous examples where it has
responded with indictments against bad actors,4 the agency has regrettably
failed to deter multiple recent calamities from the dot-com crash of 2000,
to the accounting scandals of 2001–2002 that led to the bankruptcies of
Enron and WorldCom, through incidents in the mutual fund market in

*
University of Connecticut School of Law, J.D. Candidate with Certificate in Law and Public
Policy 2014; Yale University, B.A. 2005. I would like to thank the staffs of Volumes 45 and 46 of the
Connecticut Law Review who contributed to the editing of this Note. I would also like to thank my
parents, Nancy Lunney and George Albert Miles, for their past and continued love and support.
1
Abigail Tucker, The Financial Panic of 1907: Running from History, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Oct.
10, 2008), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history-archaeology/1907_Panic.html.
2
See, e.g., Creating the Consumer Bureau, CFPB, http://www.consumerfinance.gov/thebureau/creatingthebureau (last visited Jan. 16, 2014) (detailing how the recent financial crisis led to the
passage of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act and the creation of the
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political Economy of DoddFrank: Why Financial Reform Tends to Be Frustrated and Systemic Risk Perpetuated, 97 CORNELL L.
REV. 1019, 1020–21 (2012) (highlighting instances of new legislation following economic catastrophes
and discussing the motivations for such legislation).
3
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 6,
2013).
4
E.g., SEC Enforcement Actions: Addressing Misconduct that Led to or Arose from the Financial
Crisis, SEC, http://www.sec.gov/spotlight/enf-actions-fc.shtml (last modified Sept. 3, 2013).
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2003–2004 and stock option backdating in 2006, to the latest crisis.5 As a
result of this poor performance, one of the SEC’s own Commissioners
grimily acknowledged studies that have reported that “79% of investors
have no trust in the financial system” and “61% of investors have no
This is very troublesome
confidence in government regulators.”6
considering the still fragile economy7 in which almost three-quarters of
Americans’ financial assets are invested in securities-related products.8
The most frequent and freshest criticism leveled against federal
enforcement agencies by the news media and Congress is that those who
work in our nation’s largest financial institutions have become “too big to
jail.”9 While the SEC, which is strictly a civil enforcement entity, has no
authority to incarcerate criminals,10 several financial reporters and legal
commentators have argued that the agency’s policies, specifically its
overreliance on negotiating backdoor settlements instead of openly
prosecuting illegal activity in courts, insufficiently punishes misconduct
and is ineffective in deterring risky behaviors that create new crises.11
Indeed, it has been argued that the SEC settles its investigations anywhere
from 67%,12 to 90%,13 or 98%14 of the time, often with recidivist

5
John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does the Treasury Have a Better
Idea?, 95 VA. L. REV. 707, 712–13 (2009).
6
Luis Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Taking a No-Nonsense Approach to
Enforcing the Federal Securities Laws, Address Before the Securities Enforcement Forum 2012 (Oct.
18, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/1365171491510.
7
See Jonathan Weisman, Senate Passes $3.7 Trillion Budget, Setting Up Contentious
Negotiations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2013, at A20 (quoting U.S. Senator Patty Murray who said “[w]ith
an unemployment rate that remains stubbornly high, and a middle class that has seen their wages
stagnate for far too long, we simply cannot afford any threats to our fragile recovery”).
8
Coffee & Sale, supra note 5, at 727.
9
E.g., Press Release, Sherrod Brown: Senator for Ohio, Sens. Brown, Grassley Press Justice
Department
on
“Too
Big
To
Jail”
(Jan.
29,
2013),
available
at
http://www.brown.senate.gov/newsroom/press/release/sens-brown-grassley-press-justice-departmenton-too-big-to-jail; Editorial, Too Big to Fail, Too Big to Jail, NEW HAVEN REG. (Jan. 1, 2013),
http://www.nhregister.com/general-news/20130101/editorial-too-big-to-fail-too-big-to-jail.
10
Robert Khuzami, Dir., U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enforcement, Remarks Before the
Consumer Federation of America’s Financial Services Conference (Dec. 1, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch120111rk.htm.
11
E.g., Ross MacDonald, Note, Setting Examples, Not Settling: Toward a New Enforcement
Paradigm, 91 TEX. L. REV. 419, 419–20 (2012); Matt Levine, Maybe This Time Citi Actually Will Stop
Violating Securities Laws, but Don’t Hold Your Breath, DEALBREAKER (Nov. 8, 2011, 6:49 PM),
http://dealbreaker.com/2011/11/maybe-this-time-citi-actually-will-stop-violating-securities-laws-butdont-hold-your-breath.
12
Examining the Settlement Practices of U.S. Financial Regulators: Hearing Before the H.
Comm. on Fin. Servs., 112th Cong. 28 (2012) [hereinafter Settlement Practices Hearing] (statement of
Robert Khuzami, Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement).
13
Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against
Broker-Dealers, 67 BUS. LAW. 679, 698 (2012).
14
MacDonald, supra note 11, at 421.
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corporations.
One specific aspect of these settlements, which allows
defendants to settle without admitting or denying the allegations of
wrongdoing in a complaint,16 has garnered considerable negative attention
and drawn the ire of several judges tasked with reviewing the
agreements.17
One case in particular, SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets Inc.,18 which
is now before the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,19
has led to a congressional hearing20 and sparked extensive coverage in the
press,21 as well as analysis by industry lawyers22 and academics.23 Around
October 2006, various members of Citigroup’s financial securities
subsidiary Citigroup Global Markets Inc. (“CGMI”) allegedly sought to
profit by betting against assets from a collateralized debt obligation
(“CDO”) that CGMI itself structured and marketed.24 Working with
another investment company, CGMI created and opened a $1 billion CDO
titled “Class V Funding III” (“Class V III”) that closed on February 28,
2007.25 CGMI “exercised significant influence” over the construction of
Class V III resulting in subprime residential mortgage-backed securities

15
Jayne W. Barnard, Securities Fraud, Recidivism, and Deterrence, 113 PENN ST. L. REV. 189,
220 (2008).
16
See 17 C.F.R. § 202.5(e) (2013) (“[T]he Commission believes that a refusal to admit the
allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent states that he neither admits nor
denies the allegations.”).
17
Rakoff’s Revenge, ECONOMIST (Apr. 13, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/finance-andeconomics/21576132-rejections-settlements-financial-institutions-are-catching-rakoffs.
18
827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
19
Peter Lattman, Court Hears Arguments on Judge’s Rejection of S.E.C.-Citigroup Deal,
DEALBOOK (Feb. 8, 2013), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/02/08/appeals-court-hears-argumentsover-judge-rakoffs-rejection-of-citigroup-settlement.
20
Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 1–2 (statement of Rep. Spencer Bachus,
Chairman, House Committee on Financial Services).
21
E.g., David S. Hilzenrath, Judge Chafes at Size of SEC Deal with Citigroup, WASH. POST, Nov.
10, 2011, at A16; Nate Raymond, Appeals Court Hears Arguments in SEC’s Case Against Citigroup,
REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/08/us-citigroup-sec-appealidUSBRE9170YQ20130208.
22
E.g., William O. Reckler & Blake T. Denton, Understanding Recent Changes to the SEC’s
“Neither Admit nor Deny” Settlement Policy, LATHAM & WATKINS (Jan. 12, 2012),
http://www.lw.com/thoughtLeadership/sec-eliminates-denial-option-for-settling-defendants; F. Joseph
Warin et al., “Potential Game-Changer” at Two Years: The SEC’s Use of Deferred and NonProsecution Agreements, FINDLAW (May 25, 2012), http://practice.findlaw.com/practice-guide/potential-game-changer-at-two-years-the-sec-s-use-of-deferred-.html.
23
E.g., Michael C. Macchiarola, “Hallowed by History, but Not by Reason”: Judge Rakoff’s
Critique of the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Consent Judgment Practice, 16 CUNY L. REV.
51 (2012).
24
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Citigroup to Pay $285 Million to Settle SEC
Charges for Misleading Investors About CDO Tied to Housing Market (Oct. 19, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-214.htm.
25
Id.
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26

accounting for half of the CDO’s value. Additionally, CGMI used credit
default swaps to purchase $500 million worth of protection, which
amounted, in financial terms, to taking a “short position” on the portfolio.27
In evaluating the CDO, the SEC highlighted experienced traders who
commented that “the portfolio is horrible,” that the assets are “‘dogsh!t’
and ‘possibly the best short EVER!’”28 Almost nine months after the CDO
was put on the market, it defaulted, causing approximately fifteen investors
to lose “virtually their entire investments”29 that had an original “face value
of approximately $843 million,”30 while CGMI netted “at least $160
million” in fees and trading profits.31
The general public became familiar with CDOs following the 2008
financial crisis in which these highly complex products magnified the
severity of the disaster.32 Investors in CDOs who believed they were either
misled or defrauded by marketing materials from bank underwriters or
CDO managers have filed numerous lawsuits but, thus far, they have had
limited success.33 Notably, Citigroup alone marketed more than $20
billion in CDOs during 2007, “most of which failed spectacularly.”34 A
Citigroup spokesman in 2011 expressed the belief that the Class V III case
is the only action the SEC will take concerning its CDOs.35
At issue on appeal in the Citigroup case is District Court Judge Jed
Rakoff’s refusal to approve a settled $285 million consent judgment
reached between the two parties where CGMI neither admitted nor denied
the allegations of the SEC complaint.36 Judge Rakoff based his ruling on
the failure of the settlement to present enough factual evidence to pass the
accepted judicial review standard:37 ‘‘whether the proposed Consent
Judgment . . . is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest.’’38
26
Complaint at 1–2, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(No. 11 Civ. 7387).
27
Id. See generally JEFF CONNAUGHTON, THE PAYOFF: WHY WALL STREET ALWAYS WINS 148–
49 (2012) (providing more information on short selling securities).
28
Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 24.
29
Id.
30
Complaint, supra note 26, at 16.
31
Id. at 3.
32
Fanni Koszeg, Will CDO Managers Be Held Accountable for Their Role in the Financial
Crisis?, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 22, 2012), http://www.bna.com/cdo-managers-held-n17179870393/.
33
Id.
34
Jesse Eisinger & Jake Bernstein, Did Citi Get a Sweet Deal? Bank Claims SEC Settlement on
One CDO Clears It on All Others, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 20, 2011), http://www.propublica.org/article/didciti-get-a-sweet-deal-banks-says-sec-settlement-on-one-cdo-clears-it-on.
35
Id.
36
SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 330, 334 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
37
Id. at 330.
38
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange
Commission in Support of Proposed Settlement at 5, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328
(No. 11 Civ. 7387)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Judge Rakoff blamed the SEC for the lack of proof, writing that the agency
“has a duty, inherent in its statutory mission, to see that the truth emerges;
and if it fails to do so, this Court must not, in the name of deference or
convenience, grant judicial enforcement.”39
While several have commented on how the Citigroup case should
affect the manner in which the SEC conducts its work in the future40 or
advocated that Congress should pass new laws to expand the SEC’s
powers,41 no one yet has argued what role the judiciary should play in any
change.42 Regardless of how the Second Circuit ultimately decides the
Citigroup case, other judges in other districts have raised issues with or
rejected similar settlements,43 and so the topic will not be clearly resolved
in the near future. At the heart of the controversy is a separation of powers
issue concerning how much discretion federal judges must give executive
agencies, and how jurists and regulators do and should consider the public
interest when deciding to resolve cases.
This Note does not contend that courts can or should strip the agency
of its ability to settle cases on a no admit, no deny (“NAND”) basis. But it
argues, based on a careful examination of the history and policy
machinations behind NAND settlements, that the current judicial review
standard does not appropriately handle the complexity of the issues and
interests involved. As this Note’s summary of the Citigroup case and
others will demonstrate, NAND settlements can lead to the submission of
factually deficient court documents that blur the lines of illegal conduct
thereby weakening transparency of securities enforcement for the courts
and the public. Recidivism by defendants is incited due to the opaqueness
of these types of agreements coupled with the fact that they regularly
diminish the size and scope of the punishments imposed. Absent a guilty
admission of statutory violations, misconduct is written off as a cost of
doing business, with the price worth paying because these types of
39

Id. at 335.
E.g., MacDonald, supra note 11, at 447.
41
Letter from Mary L. Schapiro, Chairman, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, to Senator Jack Reed,
Chairman, Subcomm. on Sec., Ins., & Inv. of the S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs (Nov.
28, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/74820022/Mary-Schapiro-s-Letter-to-Senator-JackReed.
42
See Gadinis, supra note 13, at 682 (“[A]cademic commentators have largely ignored this area
of the law in the last two decades, despite continuous practitioner interest.”).
43
See SEC v. Hohol, No. 14-C-41, 2014 WL 461217 (E.D. Wis. Feb. 5, 2014) (order requesting
additional information as to why the court should accept the proposed judgments); SEC v. Bridge
Premium Fin., LLC, No. 1:12-cv-02131-JLK-BNB (D. Colo. Jan. 17, 2013) (order denying entry of
final judgments); Edward Wyatt, In Challenging S.E.C. Settlement, a Judge in Wisconsin Cites a Court
in New York, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2011, at B4 (discussing a SEC settlement with the Koss
Corporation before the Eastern District of Wisconsin); Christopher M. Matthews, Judge Blasts IBM,
SEC Bribery Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 20, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142412788
7323777204578192040347143214.html (summarizing a district court judge’s decision from the
District of Columbia that rejected a SEC settlement with IBM).
40
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settlements severely undercut efforts by members of the public who are
harmed by violations to recover their losses.44
Indeed, the central tradeoff with NAND settlements from a regulatory
standpoint is that judgments without that provision would collaterally estop
(i.e., preclude) the defendants from re-litigating the same allegations in
later private civil suits, thereby increasing the probability that investors
could successfully recover damages.45 By contrast, a NAND settlement
compels harmed investors to establish their own evidence to fully recover
their losses. This is troubling. Consider, for example, the Citigroup case
in which only $285 million was potentially set aside to the group of
investors46 who collectively lost $700 to $843 million.47 The investors are
left on their own, unable to use the SEC’s investigation as a basis for their
claims. Given the time and taxpayer money the SEC undoubtedly spent
investigating the case, it is worrisome that the current system sanctions
settlements where only a fraction of the overall harm (34–41% in
Citigroup) is penalized and members of the public are given little
assistance in addressing the matter. It logically follows that extra costs are
shifted onto the courts as well since they must spend more time overseeing
private suits that are more drawn-out as a result of the SEC’s deal-making.
This Note argues that the interests of the public, especially those of
harmed investors, must be given more consideration by those who work at
the SEC and in the judiciary, and the Citigroup case and those of its ilk
present opportunities to cultivate a better enforcement framework that can
more productively utilize the energies and balance the interests of the
public, the courts, and the SEC. Instead of allowing ineffective NAND
agreements to continue in their current form, this Note proposes that the
courts are justified in elaborating upon the current standard for settlement
review to demand that an adequate set of proven or admitted facts be
presented to allow judges to sufficiently review settlements’ terms.
Agreements that establish a more solid evidentiary foundation will
improve the overall enforcement scheme by empowering harmed investors
within the general public to pursue private litigation that can further
44
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d at 333–34; see also Aguilar, supra note 6 (noting
a SEC Commissioner’s admission that “[i]n the case of senior executives and other highly-compensated
persons, a defendant may very likely view a fine as an inconsequential cost of doing business”).
45
Brian A. Ochs et al., Sanctions and Collateral Consequences: The Stakes in SEC Enforcement
Actions, in THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES 181, 242 (Michael J.
Missal & Richard M. Phillips eds., 2d ed. 2007).
46
Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed
Settlement, supra note 38, at 3–4, 6.
47
There is a discrepancy between the original face value of the investments, $843 million,
Complaint, supra note 26, at 16, and the actual losses to investors, which the SEC later argued were “in
excess of $700 million,” SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court
Regarding Proposed Settlement at 17, Citigroup Global Markets Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ.
7387).
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discipline the conduct in the financial markets. The occurrence of such
astoundingly large settlements of $550 and $616 million that have taken
place recently48 would arguably decrease in the face of a more robust
enforcement system.
Part II will survey the factually deficient background of the Citigroup
case and summarize the central legal arguments surrounding its current
appeal to the Second Circuit. Next, Part III will examine the major actors
behind public and private securities law enforcement, beginning with an
analysis of the SEC, specifically the origin and development of its
enforcement program and settlement processes. Part III concludes with a
review of the hurdles placed in front of harmed investors seeking to
privately recover for losses due to securities fraud. Part IV will assess the
traditional role of the judiciary and the evolution of its standards for
granting injunctive relief, followed by a brief survey of the SEC’s recent
case resolution history. Finally, before concluding, Part V will present a
novel legal review framework that builds upon existing case law to create a
stronger check against improper securities settlements.
II. CONTROVERSY SURROUNDING
SEC V. CITIGROUP GLOBAL MARKETS INC.
A. The Initial Filings
On October 19, 2011, the SEC filed a complaint in the United States
District Court for the Southern District of New York alleging that
Citigroup’s subsidiary CGMI misled investors by “negligently
misrepresenting key deal terms” relating to Class V III.49 The circular for
the fund merely mentioned that “[t]he Initial CDS Asset Counterparty [i.e.,
CGMI] may provide CDS Assets as an intermediary with matching offsetting positions requested by the Manager or may provide CDS Assets
alone without any off-setting positions.”50 CGMI buried this information
on page 88 of its 192-page marketing document.51 The SEC argued that
though CGMI had interests adverse to those of the other CDO investors,
the investors were never put on notice that CGMI had a role in the CDO’s
asset selection process or that it had a $500 million short position bet
against those same assets.52 Put differently, because Class V III contained
ultimately worthless subprime mortgage-backed securities,53 CGMI was
48

Michael Rothfeld et al., SAC Hit With Record Insider Penalty, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16, 2013, at

A1.
49

Complaint, supra note 26, at 3; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 24.
Complaint, supra note 26, at 15 (emphases added).
51
Id.
52
Id. at 16.
53
Id. at 1; Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 24.
50
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accused of crafting a bad bet and promoting it to clients as a good bet,
while the company itself took the actual good bet by shorting the fund.54
In relation to CGMI, the SEC submitted separate, additional charges
against only one specific individual: former employee Brian Stoker.55 The
factual allegations in the Citigroup complaint indicated that other CGMI
employees were also involved in this CDO scheme; however, the SEC was
careful not to disclose those individuals by their full names and instead
resorted to providing broad title descriptions such as “Trading Desk Head”
or “senior Citigroup CDO structurer.”56 Similarly, although the SEC v.
Stoker57 complaint alleged that the defendant was the “lead structurer on
Class V III,”58 it mentioned him regularly communicating with other
unnamed Citi executives, indicating that Mr. Stoker was a lower-level
employee in the company hierarchy.59
The same day that the SEC brought charges, it announced a settlement
with CGMI whereby the company would: (1) disgorge itself of $160
million in alleged “net profits” (plus $30 million in interest) as well as pay
a civil penalty of $95 million; (2) undertake for three years certain internal
measures to prevent similar fraud from happening again; and (3) agree to
be permanently restrained and enjoined from future violations alleged in
the complaint.60 The SEC made no guarantee that it would distribute any
of those funds to harmed investors. Instead it merely noted that it “may by
motion propose a plan” to do so in the future.61 CGMI agreed to this
settlement “without admitting or denying” the SEC’s allegations.62 Since
the deal sought future enforcement of the agreement’s terms, it required
court approval.63
Toward supporting the settlement’s authorization (also referred to as
either a consent judgment or consent decree), the SEC filed a
54
Claire A. Hill, Bankers Behaving Badly? The Limits of Regulatory Reform, 31 REV. BANKING
& FIN. L. 675, 679–80 n.10 (2012).
55
Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed
Settlement, supra note 38, at 4. The SEC brought separate settled charges against the collateral
manager for the CDO transaction, Credit Suisse, as well as that company’s portfolio manager
responsible for the transaction. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 24. This Note
focuses exclusively on CGMI’s and its employees’ conduct within this fraudulent scheme.
56
Complaint, supra note 26, at 9.
57
865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
58
Complaint at 2, Stoker, 865 F. Supp. 2d 457 (No. 11 Civ. 7388).
59
See, e.g., id. at 11 (“[A] Managing Director on Citigroup’s CDO trading desk sent Stoker a list
of 21 recent-vintage, mezzanine CDOs on which the CDO trading desk wished to buy protection from
the CDO squared.”).
60
Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed
Settlement, supra note 38, at 3–4.
61
Id. at 3–4, 6.
62
Proposed Final Judgment as to Defendant Citigroup Global Markets Inc. at 1, SEC v. Citigroup
Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11 Civ. 7387).
63
Id. at 7.
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memorandum to the court centrally arguing the settlement met the judicial
evaluation standard in that it was “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the
public interest.”64 Additionally, in this filing, the SEC listed nine relevant
factors it had identified for determining the extent to which the agency may
penalize a corporation:
(i) corporate benefits from the violation; (ii) impact on
injured investors and current shareholders; (iii) need for
deterrence; (iv) pervasiveness of the conduct; (v) degree of
scienter; (vi) extent of the harm to investors; (vii) difficulty
of detecting the violations; (viii) voluntary remedial
measures; and (ix) extent of the cooperation, if any, with the
Commission and other law enforcement agencies.65
The SEC added that it “attempts to assess the extent of the sanction
that will best serve the interests of investors and the public while
maintaining consistency with penalty amounts previously imposed in
similar cases.”66
The SEC stated it was owed “substantial deference . . . as the
regulatory body having primary responsibility for policing the securities
markets,”67 and that the court “should be satisfied that the penalty reflects
an adequate consideration of relevant penalty factors.”68 The SEC
provided only four short paragraphs outlining why the settlement
sufficiently satisfied the evaluation standards.69 Within those paragraphs
the agency restated certain factual allegations, such as the amount it
suggested CGMI profited from the fraud, but it did not reference or
provide any comparisons to other past SEC-Citigroup settlements, nor did
it address certain factors such as the pervasiveness of the deceit in the
company or the challenge in discovering the scheme.70
B. Opposition to Settlement
Judge Rakoff was assigned to this case and on October 27, 2011, he
issued an order to the parties where he laid out a series of questions he
64
Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed
Settlement, supra note 38, at 4–5 (quoting SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp, No. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 2009
WL 2842940, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
65
Id. at 5–6 (citing Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Statement of the Securities and
Exchange Commission Concerning Financial Penalties (Jan. 4, 2006), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006-4.htm).
66
Id. at 6.
67
Id. at 5 (quoting SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215 (JSR),
2010 WL 624581, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
68
Id.
69
Id. at 6–7.
70
Id.
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would ask at a November 9, 2011 hearing toward reaching a decision
concerning the consent judgment.71 Judge Rakoff’s inquiries ranged from
the methodological (how the SEC calculated the $95 million penalty) to
the philosophical (questioning how judgment can be imposed against
someone who neither admits nor denies wrongdoing), permitting the
parties to provide written responses in addition to speaking at the hearing.72
Further complicating matters were attempts from several outside parties to
oppose the deal in court. On November 5, 2011, Better Markets submitted
a motion to intervene.73 In its supporting memorandum, Better Markets—a
non-profit organization—argued that it should be allowed to object to the
proposed settlement primarily because “the SEC has not, is not and will
not adequately represent the public interest.”74 Judge Rakoff denied Better
Markets’s motion on grounds presented by the SEC75 in the agency’s
opposition memorandum.76 Similarly, three insurance companies involved
in private litigation against CGMI requested that they collectively be
allowed to file an amicus curiae brief in opposition to the settlement so that
the evidence collected by the SEC investigation would “see the light of
day.”77 Judge Rakoff denied their motion based on arguments made by
CGMI.78
The news media and industry commentators expressed substantial
criticism of the settlement immediately before and after the court hearing,
much of which centered on the SEC’s failure to acknowledge Citigroup’s
recent past. Citigroup was characterized as a “serial fraud offender”79 and

71
Order at 1, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (No. 11
Civ. 7387).
72
Id. at 1–3.
73
Motion to Intervene Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure at 24, Citigroup Global Mkts.
Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387).
74
Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion to Intervene at 1, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827
F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387).
75
Order Denying Motion to Intervene, Citigroup Global Mrkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11
Civ. 7387).
76
Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Intervene Pursuant to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure at 24, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387). The
SEC argued that Better Markets had “no direct, concrete, and legally protected interest in the outcome.”
Id. at 1. The agency also noted that “there is a presumption that the [SEC] is representing the interests
of the public in the financial markets,” and that “Better Markets’ disagreement with the terms of the
proposed consent judgment does not establish that the public interest is represented inadequately by the
[SEC].” Id. at 2.
77
Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. et al. Notice of Motion and Motion for Leave to File Amicus Curiae
Brief at 3, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387).
78
Order Denying Motion to File Amicus Curiae Brief, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp.
2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387).
79
Matt Taibbi, Finally, a Judge Stands Up to Wall Street, TAIBBLOG (Nov. 10, 2011, 10:07 AM),
http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/blogs/taibblog/finally-a-judge-stands-up-to-wall-street-20111110.
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80

“repeat offender” of violating securities laws. Reportedly, the SEC had
accused CGMI of securities fraud five times since 200381 and, in each
instance, NAND settlements were reached where Citigroup either
consented to a SEC order, barring it from committing the same types of
violations again, or to a court injunction.82 A Citigroup spokesman denied
that the Class V III-related settlement had any connection to these past
charges, stating that “[l]ike all other major financial institutions, Citi has
entered into various settlements with the S.E.C. over the years and there is
no basis for any assertion that Citi has violated the terms of any of those
settlements.”83
However the media examined those past deals and seriously
questioned why the SEC was not enforcing the terms of its prior
agreements with Citigroup. The agency already had two cease-and-desist
orders, one from a 2005 settlement and the other from a 2006 case, which
barred Citigroup from “future violations of the same section of the
securities laws that the company now stands accused of breaking again.”84
One commentator suggested that the SEC could have charged Citigroup in
its 2011 complaint for violating a different fraud statute such that the
agency “could have triggered a violation of a court injunction that
Citigroup agreed to in 2003, as part of a $400 million settlement over
allegedly fraudulent analyst-research reports.”85 Yet even when the SEC
had a prior chance to actually utilize that injunction in another instance
involving Citigroup in December 2008, it decided not to ask that the
existing court order be enforced but instead reached a new agreement that
included a new injunction order.86 Finally, in each of the settlements, the
agency granted waivers so that Citigroup could continue its business; yet
when the company would later be accused of breaking the same laws
again, the SEC never revoked any of the prior waivers.87
Several commentators also criticized the lack of facts provided by the
SEC in support of the proposed 2011 agreement. It was argued the facts
alleged in the complaint “suggested deliberate misconduct” by Citigroup
and that the one named defendant was simply “a low-level banker who
80
Going to Court to Stop SEC Settlement with Citigroup, BETTER MARKETS (Nov. 6, 2011, 2:48
PM), http://bettermarkets.com/blogs/going-court-stop-sec-settlement-citigroup.
81
Jonathan Weil, Citigroup Finds Obeying the Law Is Too Darn Hard, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov.
7, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-11-02/citigroup-finds-obeying-the-law-is-too-darnhard-jonathan-weil.html.
82
Id.
83
Edward Wyatt, Promises Made, and Remade, by Firms in S.E.C. Fraud Cases, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 8, 2011, at A1.
84
Weil, supra note 81.
85
See id. (claiming the agency “neatly avoided that outcome”).
86
Id.
87
Id.
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88

clearly didn’t act alone.” It was also noted that the SEC simply provided
an estimate of the revenues and benefits Citigroup made from the alleged
fraud without disclosing concrete details.89 Better Markets’s President
asserted that, in what then was “the second quickest CDO deal to fail in
history,” Citigroup made “at least $624 million and almost certainly much
more” while its investors lost “at least $847 million.”90
The scale of the settlement, as compared to the largess of Citigroup,
was also a point of criticism. The $95 million penalty in the proposed
settlement was described as “a pittance compared with [Citigroup’s] $3.8
billion of earnings last quarter.”91 Better Markets called the settlement
“indefensible” and the penalty “so trivial it isn’t even a rounding error to
the global mega-bank” that has “$2 trillion in assets and revenues of more
than $20 billion in the last three months.”92 An analogy was made to “a
mugger who steals $70 from some lady’s wallet being sentenced to walk
free after paying back twelve bucks.”93 The consensus opinion was that
“[e]nough is enough.”94
C. The SEC and Citigroup Reactions
In this environment, the SEC submitted a memorandum responding to
Judge Rakoff’s order that was over four times the length of its original
filing supporting the proposed consent judgment.95 The agency provided
new background information claiming that it had conducted a “thorough
investigation” and that the settlement was arrived at after “extensive
88

Id.
Going to Court to Stop SEC Settlement with Citigroup, supra note 80.
90
Dennis M. Kelleher, Are the SEC and Citigroup Deceiving a Federal Judge?, HUFFINGTON
POST BUS. (Nov. 17, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dennis-m-kelleher/are-the-sec-andcitigroup_b_1096270.html.
91
Weil, supra note 81.
92
Going to Court to Stop SEC Settlement with Citigroup, supra note 80.
93
Taibbi, supra note 79.
94
Weil, supra note 81; see also Taibbi, supra note 79 (calling the SEC a “captured regulatory
agency” that “does nothing except issue new (soon-to-be-ignored-again) injunctions”); Going to Court
to Stop SEC Settlement with Citigroup, supra note 80 (“Such settlements don’t deter crime. They
reward it . . . .”). But see Matt Levine, So Maybe Citi Created a Mortgage-Backed Security Filled with
Loans They Knew Were Going to Fail so that They Could Sell It to a Client Who Wasn’t Aware that
They Sabotaged It by Intentionally Picking the Misleadingly Rated Loans Most Likely to be Defaulted
Upon, So What?, DEALBREAKER (Oct. 19, 2011, 2:16 PM), http://dealbreaker.com/2011/10/so-maybeciti-created-a-mortgage-backed-security-filled-with-loans-they-knew-were-going-to-fail-so-that-theycould-sell-it-to-a-client-who-wasnt-aware-that-they-sabotaged-it-by-intentionally-picking/ (arguing that
the investors should have recognized the risk of shorting involved, but acknowledging “the offering
document isn’t exactly putting reference security quality front-and-center, or making credit analysis
transparent”).
95
Compare SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court Regarding
Proposed Settlement, supra note 47 (twenty-nine pages), with Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities &
Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed Settlement, supra note 38 (seven pages).
89
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96

discussions and negotiations.” It acknowledged that “[i]t is reasonable to
estimate . . . that total investor loss or expected loss with respect to the
Class V [III] CDO transaction is in excess of $700 million,” but noted that
“the precise calculation of investor losses is not required in connection
with the resolution of an enforcement action brought by the SEC.”97 The
agency provided no new estimate in terms of how much Citigroup
benefited monetarily from the CDO98 and thus implicitly stood by its
earlier net profits figure rather than revise it to a “gross gain” amount,
which is mandated by statute.99 The SEC noted, “Citigroup did not
provide an extraordinary level of cooperation to the Commission in the
investigation of this matter.”100 The agency also recognized that Citigroup
had been subject to prior enforcement actions but failed to state explicitly
that recidivism was in fact considered.101
Most significantly, the SEC argued that “[t]he proposed consent
judgment embodying this settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable, and
should be entered by this Court,”102 thereby excluding the “public interest”
requirement it had originally asserted.103 In a footnote, the SEC argued
that:
Although [it] strongly believes that the proposed consent
judgment here is in the public interest, that is not part of
applicable standard of judicial review. As . . . the Second
Circuit has held[,] . . . a consent decree in an SEC
enforcement action ‘ought to be approved’ so long as it is not
“unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable.”104
The SEC next asserted that there was a presumption of fairness,
adequacy, and reasonableness for the settlement since “the proposed
consent judgment here was negotiated at arm’s length between parties
represented by experienced counsel after a comprehensive
96
SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court Regarding Proposed
Settlement, supra note 47, at 1.
97
Id. at 17.
98
See id. at 20 (“Citigroup directly benefited in the amount of approximately $160 million as a
result of the Class V CDO transaction.”).
99
See infra note 248 and accompanying text.
100
SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court Regarding
Proposed Settlement, supra note 47, at 21.
101
See id. (noting “recidivism is taken into account by the Commission in determining the
appropriate penalty in a given case” but not manifestly in this case).
102
Id. at 1.
103
Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange Commission in Support of Proposed
Settlement, supra note 38, at 5 (quoting SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp, No. 09-CV-6829 (JSR), 2009 WL
2842940, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2009)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
104
SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Response to Questions Posed by the Court Regarding
Proposed Settlement, supra note 47, at 4 n.1 (citations omitted) (quoting SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85
(2d Cir. 1991)).
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105

investigation.”
Given that presumption, the agency stated that a court
may reject the agreement “only if any of the terms appear ambiguous, if
the enforcement mechanism is inadequate, if third parties will be positively
injured, or if the decree otherwise makes a mockery of judicial power.”106
The SEC asserted there were no such defects and that ultimately the district
court should enter the judgment.107
The SEC also notably addressed its NAND policy and argued that it
sufficiently notifies the public about what took place. It argued that “this
approach has succeeded in clearly conveying that the conduct alleged did
in fact occur.”108 The agency also noted that the public filing of the
allegations via the complaint creates “transparency regarding misconduct
by companies in the securities industry.”109 Finally it added that “whatever
public interest is served by a factual resolution of any disputed issues is
likely to be realized in the related proceedings against Mr. Stoker.”110
CGMI also filed a response brief on November 7, 2011, in which it
largely deferred to the arguments presented by the SEC.111 The company
argued for the same legal standard that the agency asserted in its response
filing.112 Regardless of whether CGMI considered the public interest to be
a review requirement, it advocated that “as a general matter, the ‘public
interest’ is served by sophisticated litigants compromising complicated
matters in a manner that avoids wasteful litigation and exposing both
parties to extreme results.”113
CGMI also added to the factual background of the case by noting that
the SEC’s investigation was a “multi-year inquiry” that created an
“extensive record . . . which include[d] the review of over 30 million pages
of documents and testimony from several current and former CGMI
employees.”114 CGMI argued that there would be “a number of substantial
factual and legal issues that would need to be litigated in the absence of a
settlement.”115 For instance, it quoted from another page in its circular that
105

Id. at 9.
Id. at 10 (quoting Massachusetts v. Microsoft Corp., 373 F.3d 1199, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2004)).
107
Id.
108
Id. at 12.
109
Id. at 15.
110
Id.
111
Memorandum on Behalf of Citigroup Global Markets Inc. in Support of the Proposed Final
Judgment and Consent at 6, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(No. 11 Civ. 7387).
112
See id. at 5 (citing SEC v. Wang, 944 F.2d 80, 85 (2d Cir. 1991); SEC v. WorldCom, Inc., 273
F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)) (“The standard for judicial review and approval of a proposed
consent judgment in an SEC enforcement action is whether the settlement is fair, reasonable, and
adequate.”).
113
Id. at 6.
114
Id. at 4.
115
Id.
106
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“CGMI ‘may be expected to have interests that are adverse to the interests
of the Noteholders.’”116 The company emphasized that based on the SEC
allegations, there was no deliberate intent or coordination at CGMI to
violate the law.117
D. Judge Rakoff’s Response
Media coverage of the hearing on November 9, 2011, characterized
Judge Rakoff as “mock[ing] the SEC’s traditional way of doing business”
as it concerned its NAND policy, and quoted him describing the agency’s
unproven allegations as being “no better than rumor or gossip.”118 The
Judge also “suggested that the injunctions are ‘just for show,’” and the
requirement that CGMI take remedial steps to prevent future violations
amounted to what he called “window dressing.”119 At one point, Judge
Rakoff described the SEC’s argument that the court should not consider
whether the settlement served the public interest as “[a]n interesting
position,” adding that it left him “to exercise [his] power but not [his]
judgment.”120 Ultimately the Judge did not rule from the bench after the
hour-long hearing.121
Instead he issued a written opinion on November 28, 2011, in which he
rejected the parties’ consent judgment and set a trial date.122 Judge Rakoff
began his opinion by questioning why the SEC chose to charge CGMI only
with negligence when it seemed to allege intentional conduct against the
company in its complaint against Brian Stoker by stating that:
Citigroup knew it would be difficult to place the liabilities of
[the Fund] if it disclosed to investors its intention to use the
vehicle to short a hand-picked set of [poorly rated
assets] . . . . By contrast, Citigroup knew that representing to
investors that an experienced third-party investment adviser
had selected the portfolio would facilitate the placement of
the [Fund’s] liabilities.123
116

Id. (emphasis omitted).
See id. at 17–19 (“[T]he SEC has elected to charge a mid-level CGMI employee with
nonscienter-based violations of the securities laws . . . and no employee senior to Mr. Stoker has been
named in these proceedings.”).
118
David S. Hilzenrath, Judge Chafes at Size of SEC Deal with Citigroup, WASH. POST, Nov. 10,
2011, at A16.
119
Id.
120
Jonathan Stempel & Grant McCool, Update 1-Judge Questions Adequacy of SEC-Citigroup
Accord, REUTERS (Nov. 9, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/09/citigroup-secidUSN1E7A826C20111109.
121
Id.
122
SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
123
Id. at 330 (alteration in original) (quoting Complaint, supra note 58, at 10) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
117
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Judge Rakoff then noted the change in review standards submitted in
the SEC’s original memorandum as compared to its reply brief, and flatly
rejected the notion that the public interest is not a requirement, calling such
an assertion “erroneous.”124 The Judge pointed to opinions from the
Supreme Court and the Second Circuit that directed courts in the context of
granting injunctive relief to consider the “public interest”125 or “public
consequences.”126
Though Judge Rakoff acknowledged he must give “substantial
deference to the views of the administrative agency”127 in these settlement
matters, he rejected the idea that “the S.E.C. is the sole determiner of what
is in the public interest.”128 Without directly citing any authority, the Judge
argued that in these types of cases courts must apply “a modicum of
independent judgment in determining whether the requested deployment of
its injunctive powers will serve, or disserve, the public interest. Anything
less would not only violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of
powers but would undermine the independence that is the indispensable
attribute of the federal judiciary.”129 On that basis, Judge Rakoff argued he
could not conduct an independent analysis because the SEC did “not
provide the Court with a sufficient evidentiary basis to know whether the
requested relief [was] justified.”130
Going further, Judge Rakoff did not just question the paucity of facts
presented, but also the existence and effects of the SEC’s NAND rule,
describing it as “hallowed by history, but not by reason,” whereby it
“deprives the Court of even the most minimal assurance that the substantial
injunctive relief it is being asked to impose has any basis in fact.”131 He
rejected the SEC’s argument that the public should view the allegations as
facts because “[a]s a matter of law, an allegation that is neither admitted
nor denied is simply that, an allegation. It has no evidentiary value and no
collateral estoppel effect.”132 Distinguishing NAND allegations from the
information needed to conduct an independent review, Judge Rakoff
indicated that he needed “proven or admitted facts”133 or “proven or
acknowledged facts”134 and that ultimately, he was not given “any” of
those specifics in this case.135
124

Id. at 330–31.
Id. at 331 (citing eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006)).
126
Id. (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008)).
127
Id. at 332.
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Id. at 331.
129
Id.
130
Id. at 332.
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Id.
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Id. at 333.
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Id. at 330.
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Id. at 335.
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Id. at 330, 335.
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Turning to the relevant standard for judicial review, Judge Rakoff
argued that all four requirements—that an agreement be fair, reasonable,
adequate, and in the public interest—“inform each other.”137 As such, a
deal must be “fair to parties and to the public.”138 Judge Rakoff
determined that the proposed settlement, along with the NAND policy,
served the narrow interests of just the parties.139 He argued that “[i]f the
allegations of the Complaint are true, this is a very good deal for
Citigroup;”140 mere “pocket change to any entity as large as Citigroup,”141
and just “a cost of doing business.”142 He also noted that the agreement
“imposes the kind of injunctive relief that Citigroup (a recidivist) knew
that the S.E.C. had not sought to enforce against any financial institution
for at least the last 10 years.”143 Judge Rakoff could not discern what the
SEC would achieve beyond getting “a quick headline.”144
In evaluating the four requirements, Judge Rakoff asserted that
notwithstanding “the substantial deference due the S.E.C. in matters of this
kind,”145 “the proposed Consent Judgment is neither fair, nor reasonable,
nor adequate, nor in the public interest.”146 He explained that:
It is not reasonable, because how can it ever be reasonable to
impose substantial relief on the basis of mere allegations? It
is not fair, because, despite Citigroup’s nominal consent, the
potential for abuse in imposing penalties on the basis of facts
that are neither proven nor acknowledged is patent. It is not
adequate, because, in the absence of any facts, the Court
lacks a framework for determining adequacy. And, most
obviously, the proposed Consent Judgment does not serve the
public interest, because it asks the Court to employ its power
and assert its authority when it does not know the facts.147
Judge Rakoff concluded that if he were to accept the SEC-CGMI
agreement without “some knowledge of what the underlying facts
136
“Whether the proposed Consent Judgment . . . is fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public
interest.” Id. at 330 (alteration in original) (quoting Memorandum by Plaintiff Securities & Exchange
Commission in Support of Proposed Settlement, supra note 38, at 5) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
137
Id. at 331–32.
138
Id. at 332.
139
Id. at 333.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 334.
142
Id. at 333.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id. at 330.
146
Id. at 332.
147
Id. at 335.
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[were] . . . [then] the court [would] become[] a mere handmaiden to a
settlement privately negotiated on the basis of unknown facts, while the
public is deprived of ever knowing the truth in a matter of obvious public
importance.”148 Having rejected the proposed agreement, Judge Rakoff
decided to consolidate the CGMI case with the action against Brian Stoker
and directed the parties to prepare for a trial date of July 16, 2012.149
E. The Appeal and Stoker Trial
The SEC quickly reacted to this rejection by vehemently disagreeing
with Judge Rakoff’s opinion and interpreting his rhetorical flourishes and
desire for admitted facts as an order that it could no longer reach NAND
settlements. The SEC Division of Enforcement Director stated that the
agency believed “the district court committed legal error by announcing a
new and unprecedented standard . . . . in requiring an admission of facts—
or a trial—as a condition of approving a proposed consent judgment.”150
In other statements, the SEC sought to justify its NAND settlements (e.g.,
how they avoid the risk of litigation and conserve budgetary resources)
while also arguing that the monetary penalties would go to harmed
investors.151
Both the SEC and Citigroup filed appeals to Judge Rakoff’s
decision.152 Following a hearing, a court of appeals merit panel filed a per
curiam opinion on March 15, 2012, granting a permanent stay until another
panel in the future could decide whether or not Judge Rakoff’s rejection of
the consent judgment should be set aside.153 While this panel stated that
“we are satisfied . . . that the S.E.C. and Citigroup have made a strong
showing of likelihood of success in setting aside the district court’s
rejection of their settlement,” they also noted that they had “not had the
benefit of adversarial briefing.”154 As such, they added that “[t]he merits
panel is, of course, free to resolve all issues without preclusive effect from
this ruling.”155 On March 16, 2012, the court appointed John Wing, a
148

Id. at 332 (emphasis added).
Id. at 335.
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Robert Khuzami, Director, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enforcement, SEC
Enforcement Director’s Statement on Citigroup Case (Dec. 15, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2011/2011-265.htm.
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Robert Khuzami, Director, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n Div. of Enforcement, Public Statement
by SEC Staff: Court’s Refusal to Approve Settlement in Citigroup Case (Nov. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2011/spch112811rk.htm; Khuzami, supra note 10.
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Citigroup Global Markets Inc.’s Memorandum in Support of the Securities and Exchange
Commission’s Motion for a Stay Pending Appeal, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328
(No. 11 Civ. 7387); SEC’s Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion for Stay Pending Appeal,
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328 (No. 11 Civ. 7387).
153
SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158, 161 (2d Cir. 2012) (per curiam).
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former colleague of Judge Rakoff, to serve as pro bono counsel and
advocate for the district court’s position.156
During the summer of 2012, while the Citigroup appeal was pending,
the Stoker case proceeded through discovery and trial.157 Through filed
court documents in Stoker, the SEC revised the total losses by investors to
$893 million, and finally revealed that CGMI’s gains from the CDO were
$284 million—a figure much higher than the $160 million net profits
provided in the CGMI filings.158 Also, in Mr. Stoker’s motion for
summary judgment he “name[d] names” specifically identifying other
CGMI individuals that he alleged were part of the Class V III deal.159
Judge Rakoff rejected his motion, reasoning that just because Mr. Stoker
was one of many people involved did not absolve him of liability for his
actions.160
Yet after a two-week trial in July 2012, a jury found Mr. Stoker not
liable.161 Reportedly, his counsel gave an effective final argument utilizing
the “Where’s Waldo?” defense, which is based on a children’s book that
challenges readers to find the titular character.162 Mr. Stoker’s attorney
argued that his client was just a small part of the CDO and that “[m]ost of
[the] trial had nothing to do with Brian Stoker.”163 What this defense
boiled down to was that even though Mr. Stoker participated in the grand
scheme, he had limited authority and was being made a scapegoat for the
company’s misconduct.164
Jury comments afterward matched defense counsel’s conclusion. One
jury member stated “I’m not saying that Stoker was 100 percent innocent,
but . . . . Stoker structured a deal that his bosses told him to structure, so

156
Jonathan Stempel, Rakoff Turns to Ex-Colleague for U.S. SEC-Citi Appeal, REUTERS (Mar. 16,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/03/16/us-citigroup-sec-lawyer-idUSBRE82F1F620120316.
157
Brief of Better Markets, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Pro Bono Counsel Appointed to
Advocate for Affirmance of the District Court’s Order at 30–31, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d
158 (No. 11-5227-cv); Susan Beck, What Will We Learn from the SEC’s Case Against Citi’s Brian
Stoker?, CORP. COUNS. (July 13, 2012), http://www.law.com/corporatecounsel/PubArticleCC.jsp?id=1
202562738776&What_Will_We_Learn_From_the_SECs_Case_Against_Citis_Brian_Stoker.
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Brief of Better Markets, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Pro Bono Counsel Appointed to
Advocate for Affirmance of the District Court’s Order, supra note 157, at 35 n.24, 42.
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Beck, supra note 157.
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Litigation Release No. 22541, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Brian Stoker Found Not Liable
(Nov. 21, 2012), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/2012/lr22541.htm.
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Peter Lattman, S.E.C. Gets Encouragement from Jury that Ruled Against It, DEALBOOK (Aug.
3, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/03/s-e-c-gets-encouragement-from-jury-that-ruledagainst-it/.
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6, 2012), http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/08/06/s-e-c-gets-encouragement-but-needs-somethingmore/.
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why didn’t they go after the higher-ups rather than a fall guy?” The jury
foreman called CGMI’s actions “appalling” and added that “[t]his was not
a verdict about Citi being absolved of any wrongdoing.”166 To back up this
assertion, the jurors “did something extremely rare” and issued a statement
in conjunction with their verdict.167 Judge Rakoff read aloud that statement
in court saying “[t]his verdict should not deter the [SEC] from continuing
to investigate the financial industry, review current regulations and modify
existing regulations as necessary.”168 The SEC decided not to appeal the
jury’s decision.169
The Stoker resolution clearly affected the Citigroup appeal, as
evidenced by the pro bono counsel’s brief in which he noted that thanks to
the Stoker trial, “the district court has a substantial evidentiary record upon
which to assess the proposed consent judgment on remand if the appeal is
denied or dismissed.”170 However, before addressing pro bono counsel’s
arguments further, both the SEC and CGMI had filed their principal briefs
in May 2012 prior to the conclusion of the Stoker trial.171 Consistent with
its prior statements, the SEC’s brief principally argued that Judge Rakoff
was seeking to impose a “bright-line rule” preventing its ability to enter
NAND consent decrees in the future and that this infringed on the
independence of the agency.172 Among other issues, the SEC also argued
that the $285 million settlement met the judicial review standard because it
represented “more than 80% of what it could have reasonably expected to
obtain if it prevailed at trial.”173 CGMI made many similar arguments in
its briefs that echoed the SEC’s.174
The pro bono counsel filed his only brief in August 2012,175 and he
rejected the settling parties’ description of Judge Rakoff’s opinion.
Centrally, he argued that “[t]he ruling did not state that the ‘proof’ or
‘facts’ need[ed] to be tantamount to proof of liability–a term which easily
165

Lattman, supra note 162.
Susan Beck, Susan Beck’s Summary Judgment: Second Circuit Redeems Itself in SEC-Citi
Oral Arguments, AMLAW LITIG. DAILY (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.americanlawyer.com/digestTAL.j
sp?id=1202588044802&Susan_Becks_Summary_Judgment_Second_Circuit_Redeems_Itself_in_SEC
Citi_Oral_Arguments.
167
Lattman, supra note 162.
168
Id.
169
Litigation Release No. 22541, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, supra note 161.
170
Brief of Appointed Pro Bono Counsel for the United States District Court at 4–5, SEC v.
Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227-cv).
171
Brief of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Appellant/Petitioner, Citigroup Global Mkts.
Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (No. 11-5227-cv); Brief of Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, Citigroup Global
Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (No. 11-5227-cv).
172
Brief of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Appellant/Petitioner, supra note 171, at 2.
173
Id. at 50.
174
Brief of Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, supra note 171, at 15–17.
175
Brief of Appointed Pro Bono Counsel for the United States District Court, supra note 170.
166

2014]

LET JUDGES JUDGE

1133
176

could have been employed had the court so intended.”
Instead, he
explained, Judge Rakoff could not approve the settlement because he “had
not been provided with any ‘evidentiary basis,’ any ‘factual base,’ ‘any
proven or acknowledged facts,’ or any other factual showing whatsoever
on which to make the requisite determination.”177 The pro bono counsel
argued that what the SEC actually presented was merely “a bare-bones and
largely conclusory seven-page memorandum.”178 He also noted the
conflict between the state of mind allegations as presented in the Citigroup
and Stoker complaints (intentional conduct) and the actual charge made
against CGMI (negligence), along with the lack of explanation for
providing net profits instead of gross gain.179 He added that the parties
could have provided the court with additional information similar to what
was done for other cases.180
Both the SEC and CGMI filed reply briefs in September 2012, in
which each argued that the pro bono counsel incorrectly interpreted Judge
Rakoff’s decision.181 The SEC argued again that the ruling “establishe[d] a
bright-line rule that ha[d] no support in the law.”182 Similarly, CGMI
asserted that Judge Rakoff’s opinion “was extreme and unprecedented.”183
Oral arguments for the appeal were heard in February 2013, in which
the parties’ arguments generally reflected what they presented in their
briefs. Notably the panel appeared to conclusively reject the SEC and
CGMI argument that Judge Rakoff created a bright-line rule against
NAND settlements as one of the judges on the panel described that issue as
a “red herring.”184 As of February 2014, the panel has yet to issue an
opinion. The interest in this case has never abated as several other
individuals or organizations, including former SEC Chairman Harvey
Pitt,185 various securities law professors,186 and a group representing

176

Id. at 2.
Id. at 1–2 (quoting SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 827 F. Supp. 2d 328, 332, 335,
(S.D.N.Y. 2011)).
178
Id. at 14.
179
Id. at 2–3.
180
Id. at 4.
181
Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant at 1, SEC v. Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc.,
673 F.3d 158 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 11-5227-cv); Reply Brief of the Securities & Exchange Commission,
Appellant/Petitioner at 2, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (No. 11-5227-cv).
182
Reply Brief of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Appellant/Petitioner, supra note 181,
at 10.
183
Reply Brief of Defendant-Appellee-Cross-Appellant, supra note 181, at 1–2.
184
Nate Raymond, Appeals Court Hears Arguments in SEC’s Case Against Citigroup,
REUTERS (Feb. 8, 2013), http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/08/us-citigroup-sec-appealidUSBRE9170YQ20130208.
185
Brief of Amicus Curiae Former Securities and Exchange Commission General Counsel and
Chairman, Harvey Pitt in Support of Affirmance of District Court’s Ruling, Citigroup Global Mkts.
Inc., 673 F.3d 158 (No. 11-5227-cv).
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187

Occupy Wall Street each submitted amicus briefs for the consideration
of the appeal panel. Additionally, the courtroom for the panel’s oral
arguments was so overcrowded that more than fifty people had to watch it
on closed-circuit television in another room.188
Ultimately, the Citigroup case raises serious policy concerns about the
current effectiveness of the U.S. securities enforcement structure and calls
into question the proper roles and responsibilities of the SEC, the judiciary,
and the public. The remaining Parts of this Note will provide background
for these various groups, explore major historical trends involving each,
and analyze whether and how change is possible.
III. THE PLAINTIFFS AND DEFENDANTS IN SECURITIES LAW
A. Federal Regulatory
Organization

Philosophy

and

the

SEC

Enforcement

To understand the proper level of deference owed to the SEC in cases
like Citigroup, the agency’s current capabilities and limitations must first
be recognized along with how they affect its decision-making process and,
consequently, the interests of defendants and harmed investors. Originally,
the most significant developments in this regard were the passages of the
Securities Act of 1933189 (the “Securities Act”), and the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934190 (the “Exchange Act”), which created the SEC.191
Unlike state regulators, who may actively judge the merits of or oversee
the quality of a new securities offering through their “blue sky” statutes,
the SEC model, embracing a full disclosure philosophy that does not
approve or guarantee the soundness of the financial product, is more
passive.192 This was by design, as President Roosevelt recommended
passage of the Securities Act by emphasizing that it would “protect the
public with the least possible interference to honest business.”193
186
Brief of Amici Curiae Securities Law Scholars to Advocate for Affirmance in Support of the
District Court’s Order and Against Appellant and Appellee, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158
(No. 11-5227-cv).
187
Proposed Brief of Amicus Curiae Occupy Wall Street-Alternative Banking Group in Support
of the Public Interest and Against Appellant and Appellee, Citigroup Global Mkts. Inc., 673 F.3d 158
(No. 11-5227-cv).
188
William Alper, Oral Argument in SEC v. Citigroup, SEC. L. PROF BLOG (Feb. 8, 2013),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/2013/02/oral-argument-in-sec-v-citigroup.html.
189
Securities Act of 1933, Pub. L. No. 73-22, 48 Stat. 74 [hereinafter “Securities Act”] (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a–77aa (2012)).
190
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No.73-291, 48 Stat. 881 [hereinafter “Exchange
Act”] (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a–78pp (2012)).
191
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 3.
192
ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY PROSECUTION 41–42 (1982).
193
Id. at 42.
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The dominant rationale for disclosure is that providing all investors,
large or small, with more comprehensive and accurate information will
generate more informed and intelligent investment decisions that in turn
will lead to more fairly priced products and, consequently, make price
manipulation more difficult.194 The cornerstones of this approach are the
Securities Act (referred to as the “truth-in-securities law”), which requires
issuers to reveal the financial underpinnings of their securities products,
and the Exchange Act, which compels registration of exchanges and
While
broker-dealers along with other reporting provisions.195
“[d]isclosures must not be misleading, either affirmatively or by half-truth
or omission,”196 that edict alone cannot guarantee stable and efficient
markets; policemen are needed to provide a backstop to punish violators
and ensure all participants are following the rules.
The SEC provides this watchdog function through its Division of
Enforcement (DOE), which has arguably become its principal segment as
exhibited by the agency today, openly describing itself as “[f]irst and
foremost . . . a law enforcement agency.”197 The DOE is divided into five
specialized units with a nationwide scope, which investigate and prosecute
securities law violations across several subject areas such as foreign
corrupt practices and municipal securities.198 Typical conduct investigated
by the agency includes providing false or misleading information about
securities, selling unregistered products, breaching fiduciary duties, and
engaging in insider trading.199
The SEC has enormous discretion to conduct investigations “as it
deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated, is
violating, or is about to violate” federal securities laws.200 Its powers are
exercised by the DOE’s staff, which include attorneys, accountants, and
The SEC gains investigative leads from
other professionals.201
whistleblowers, the news media, auditors, self-regulatory organizations,
and other financial industry sources.202 However, the agency usually lags
194

SUSAN M. PHILLIPS & J. RICHARD ZECHER, THE SEC AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 28 (1981).
Id. at 9–10. Registration of new securities requires completing certain reports (e.g., S-7, S-14),
and registered corporations must periodically submit certain forms (e.g., 10-K, 10-Q) as part of this
SEC disclosure system. Id. at 28.
196
Coffee & Sale, supra note 5, at 761.
197
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 3.
198
Khuzami, supra note 10.
199
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 3.
200
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(a)(1) (2012).
201
Richard M. Phillips et al., SEC Investigations: The Heart of SEC Enforcement Practices, in
THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES, supra note 45, at 35, 39.
202
David M. Becker, What More Can Be Done to Deter Violations of the Federal Securities
Laws?, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1849, 1869 (2012).
195
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behind marketplace developments, and a former Commissioner described
it as being “always in a reactive mode” rather than acting proactively.203
There are two types of SEC investigations: informal and formal, with
the former usually leading to the latter.204 An informal investigation
involves examining brokerage records, reviewing trading data, and
interviewing witnesses, while a formal type allows the agency to issue
subpoenas that may compel testimony or document production.205 A
typical SEC investigation begins informally by DOE staff,206 and formal
investigation orders are issued at the discretion of the Division’s
Director.207
SEC enforcement actions are based on DOE recommendations, which
are developed after months or years of building a comprehensive
evidentiary record.208 The DOE substantiates its recommendations through
“action memoranda” that lay out the factual and legal foundations for its
cases, and which are presented for the consideration of the SEC
Commissioners.209 The Commissioners decide at a formal meeting
whether to bring violation charges, what type of actions to bring, the
entities or persons to be named as defendants or respondents, and what
relief to seek.210 They will also usually ask the staff’s opinion regarding
the terms that might appropriately resolve a case in advance of their
meeting.211
Overall, the SEC seeks to ensure that “it has a sound basis for its
allegations, and can meet statutory elements of the relief it is seeking.”212
An action recommendation is approved by a majority vote so long as there
is a quorum of three or more Commissioners.213 Most recommendations
are approved.214 They can authorize staff to bring an administrative action,
203

Roberta S. Karmel, Creating Law at the Securities and Exchange Commission: The Lawyer as
Prosecutor, 61 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 33, 35 (1998). The SEC is led by a group of five
Commissioners, one of whom is designated as Chairman, who are selected by the President and
confirmed by the Senate. Id. at 38.
204
6 THOMAS LEE HAZEN, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 16.2[7] (West,
Westlaw through Jan. 2014).
205
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 3.
206
Phillips et al., supra note 201, at 44.
207
6 HAZEN, supra note 204, § 16.2[7].
208
Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 75 (prepared statement of Robert Khuzami,
Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement).
209
OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, SEC DIV. OF ENFORCEMENT, ENFORCEMENT MANUAL 25 (2013),
available at http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/enforcementmanual.pdf.
210
Danné L. Johnson, SEC Settlement: Agency Self-Interest or Public Interest, 12 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 627, 644 (2007).
211
Brief of Amicus Curiae Former Securities and Exchange Commission General Counsel and
Chairman, Harvey Pitt in Support of Affirmance of District Court’s Ruling, supra note 185, at 12.
212
Id. at 13.
213
OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, supra note 209, at 26.
214
Johnson, supra note 210, at 644.
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215

file a case in federal court, or both.
Except under extraordinary
circumstances, the SEC Commissioners do not read or review complaints
before they are filed for civil enforcement actions and instead delegate
their construction to DOE staff.216
Usually, the agency will announce an enforcement action by publicly
distributing a litigation release.217 According to the SEC, the time it takes
to start an investigation and ultimately resolve a case varies from one to
three years for cases concluding in settlements, and two to four years for
cases that go to trial (with another one to three years added to that if
appealed).218 Generally, civil actions are subject to a five year statute of
limitations.219
B. The SEC Enforcement Powers
The type of action brought, whether civil or administrative, dictates the
type of sanction or relief the SEC can seek. In either setting, the agency
can seek the return of illegal profits or the imposition of monetary
penalties.220 While the administrative process has its own unique
features,221 this Note will focus primarily on civil actions like the Citigroup
case. Exclusive to the civil course, the SEC can ask a federal district court
to bar or suspend an individual from serving as a corporate officer or
director, as well as for an injunction (i.e., a court order) to require certain
supervisory arrangements or prohibit any further acts or practices that
violate the law or the agency’s rules.222
Injunctions have been the bedrock of the SEC’s enforcement program
since the agency’s founding.223 The Securities Act empowers the agency
to seek both temporary and permanent injunctive relief in federal court
“[w]henever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged
or about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will

215
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 3.
216
Brief of Amicus Curiae Former Securities and Exchange Commission General Counsel and
Chairman, Harvey Pitt in Support of Affirmance of District Court’s Ruling, supra note 185, at 23.
217
6 HAZEN, supra note 204, § 16.2[2][A].
218
Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 13 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement).
219
OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, supra note 209, at 38.
220
The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and
Facilitates Capital Formation, supra note 3.
221
See id. (describing how the agency can request “cease and desist orders, suspension or
revocation of broker-dealer and investment advisor registrations, censures, [and] bars from association
with the securities industry”).
222
Id.
223
David M. Weiss, Note, Reexamining the SEC’s Use of Obey-the-Law Injunctions, 7 U.C.
DAVIS BUS. L.J. 239, 240 (2006).
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constitute a violation.”
The other major federal securities laws,
including the Exchange Act, the Investment Company Act of 1940, and the
Investment Advisers Act of 1940, each provide the SEC with similar
authorization.225
The Supreme Court has characterized injunctive relief as “a drastic
remedy, not a mild prophylactic.”226 Despite that characterization, an
injunction cannot provide direct punishment unless someone violates its
terms, and arguably its most substantial effects are its ancillary
consequences, as broker-dealers, investment advisers, and other
participants in the securities industry may be suspended or barred based
solely on the issuance of an injunction if the SEC decides to act through an
administrative hearing.227 Typically the agency undertakes that course of
action.228
The SEC DOE Director has argued that injunctions “put the public on
notice” about violations, and forces companies to establish, fund, and
implement compliance programs to prevent future unlawful conduct.229 If
a party breaches the terms of an agreement, then an injunction becomes
“among the most formidable weapons” available to the courts.230 In this
situation, the SEC does not have to do anything, and instead will expect a
court to provide injunctive relief and enforce a contempt charge.231 Civil
contempt requires a party to cease any ongoing violations of the
injunction.232
Beyond injunctive relief the SEC can impose two types of monetary
sanctions: disgorgement and fines. The first type deprives violators of
their unjust enrichment and orders them to give up any ill-gotten gains
acquired, including pre-judgment interest.233 Though the Exchange Act
did not expressly provide for such relief, the courts in 1971 found the SEC
had the authority to seek restitution and disgorgement through its ability to
pursue injunctions.234
The second type of monetary sanction, penalties and fines, has
224

Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(b) (2012).
Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(1) (2012); Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C.
§ 80a-35(a) (2012); Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-9(d) (2012).
226
Aaron v. SEC, 446 U.S. 680, 703 (1980) (Burger, J., concurring).
227
Ochs et al., supra note 45, at 187.
228
Gadinis, supra note 13, at 691.
229
Khuzami, supra note 10.
230
United States v. Local 1804-1, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO, 44 F.3d 1091, 1095–96
(2d Cir. 1995).
231
Macchiarola, supra note 23, at 74.
232
Khuzami, supra note 10; see also Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. Bagwell, 512
U.S. 821, 827 (1994) (describing civil contempt as being “designed to compel future compliance”).
233
Gadinis, supra note 13, at 690.
234
Adam S. Zimmerman, Distributing Justice, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 500, 527–28 (2011) (citing SEC
v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 1301, 1307–08 (2d Cir. 1971)).
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expanded over time. Before 1984, the entirety of the SEC’s civil penalty
authority was found in a single provision of the Exchange Act that
permitted a $100 per day penalty against issuers who failed to file certain
statutorily required reports.235 But the passage of three statutes by
Congress—namely, the Insider Trading Sanctions Act of 1984 (“ITSA”),236
the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988
(“ITSFEA”),237 and the Securities Enforcement Remedies and Penny Stock
Reform Act of 1990 (the “Remedies Act”)238—increasingly broadened the
agency’s authority to seek damages or impose penalties.239
Historically, the SEC did not distribute funds it recovered to harmed
investors but the Remedies Act changed this by directing the agency to
design rules so that it could do so.240 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
(“Sarbanes-Oxley”),241 further developed this process by permitting the
SEC to create “Fair Funds” accounts for injured investors whereby they
can recover portions of any disgorgement or penalties received through an
agency action.242 However, unless they were originally assigned to create
a Fair Funds distribution plan, injured investors are only afforded the
ability to comment on a proposed plan and cannot formally intervene or
challenge it.243 Usually “[t]he amount of an investor’s claim is divided by
the total amount of claims and then multiplied by available funds in the
settlement.”244 Administrative costs of any distribution are subtracted from
any amounts returned.245 If there are no harmed investors, or the amounts
obtained are more than the harm caused, then the funds recovered are sent

235

Aguilar, supra note 6, n.33.
Pub. L. No. 98-376, 98 Stat. 1264.
237
Pub. L. No. 100-704, 102 Stat. 4677 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78t-1, 78u-1, 80b4a (2012)).
238
Pub. L. No. 101-429, 104 Stat. 931 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78u-2, 78u-3, 78q-2
(2012)).
239
As they related to violations of the Exchange Act specifically, ITSA increased the maximum
fine to $100,000, and ITSFEA enhanced that amount to $1 million for individuals and $2.5 million for
non-natural persons. MacDonald, supra note 11, at 424 (citing § 3, 98 Stat. at 1265; § 4, 102 Stat. at
4680). The Remedies Act authorized both the SEC and the courts in civil actions to impose monetary
penalties for violations relating to the Securities Act and the Exchange Act with amounts based upon
the gravity and magnitude of the violations caused or threatened. § 101, 104 Stat. at 932–33; § 201,
104 Stat. at 936–37.
240
Zimmerman, supra note 234, at 527–28 (citing 104 Stat. at 937–38).
241
Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 and 18
U.S.C.).
242
15 U.S.C. § 7246 (2012).
243
17 C.F.R. §§ 201.1101, 201.1103, 201.1106 (2013).
244
Zimmerman, supra note 234, at 532.
245
Richard M. Phillips & Brian A. Ochs, Settlements: Minimizing the Adverse Effects of an SEC
Enforcement Action, in THE SECURITIES ENFORCEMENT MANUAL: TACTICS AND STRATEGIES, supra
note 45, at 255, 277.
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246

to the U.S. Treasury, which was the required practice prior to the
passage of Sarbanes-Oxley.247
Taken all together, the SEC can presently penalize through two
methods: first, through a per-violation calculation that is subject to certain
caps, or second, through a calculation that allows for a fine equal to the
“gross amount of the pecuniary gain” to the defendant “as a result of the
violation.”248 The gross gain penalty is generally available only in federal
courts.249 In practice, if a violator causes $10 million in investor harm
while profiting by $2 million, the maximum amount the SEC could recover
under this scheme would be $4 million (i.e., $2 million disgorging the
profit and $2 million for a penalty equaling the gain).250
It should be noted though that a SEC action involving disgorgement
and penalty by gross gain does not necessarily need to be symmetrical. In
one recent case the SEC settled with Goldman Sachs for a disgorgement of
$15 million coupled with a penalty of $535 million,251 and in another
action involving Citigroup, the agency settled for disgorgement of only $1
matched with a penalty of $75 million.252 Thus, just because the SEC can
seek maximum recovery in any action does not necessarily mean that it
actually does or will in the future.
C. The Basics Behind and Central Justifications for SEC Settlements
Settlement is the civil analogue to criminal plea bargaining; “a truce
more than a true reconciliation . . . [that] seems preferable to judgment
because it rests on the consent of both parties and avoids the cost of a
lengthy trial.”253 A SEC civil settlement typically involves three
components: a complaint; a consent agreement by the settling party to a
specified judicial decree; and a judgment embodying the agreed-upon
relief.254 SEC consent decrees are publically accessible documents with
injunctive provisions that must be stated in reasonable detail without
246
Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 22 (statement of Robert Khuzami, Director,
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement).
247
Becker, supra note 202, at 1855.
248
E.g., Securities Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77t(d)(2) (2012); Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(3)(B)
(2012).
249
Aguilar, supra note 6.
250
Khuzami, supra note 10.
251
Matt Phillips, SEC’s Greatest Hits: Biggest. Penalties. Ever., MONEYBEAT (July 16, 2010,
11:22 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/marketbeat/2010/07/16/secs-greatest-hits-some-of-the-other-biggestpenalties.
252
Memorandum of Plaintiff Securities and Exchange Commission in Support of Entry of the
Proposed Consent Judgment at 3, SEC v. Citigroup, Inc., No. 10-cv-01277-ESH (D.D.C. Aug. 13,
2010).
253
Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073, 1075 (1984).
254
RICHARD A. ROSEN ET AL., SETTLEMENT AGREEMENTS IN COMMERCIAL DISPUTES:
NEGOTIATING, DRAFTING AND ENFORCEMENT § 34.08 (2012).
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incorporating other documents by reference.
They can be revised or
dismissed by the court, even over the protestations of one of the parties.256
In contrast, strictly private settlements may contain confidential terms that
are not held to any requisite level of particularity, can incorporate other
documents by reference, and cannot be changed by the courts without
mutual consent.257
The most significant distinction between a consent decree and a private
settlement is that a consent decree requires judicial approval while a
private settlement does not.258 This makes sense since injunctive relief
functions as a request that a court be retained as the SEC’s “ongoing
enforcement partner” that will issue contempt charges in the event of noncompliance.259 “The Supreme Court has long endorsed the propriety of the
use and entry of consent judgments.”260
In deciding whether to settle, the DOE takes many factors into account,
starting with proof, but its overall policy is that it will not recommend
settlement unless an agreement “is within the range of outcomes [it]
reasonably can expect if [it] litigate[d] through trial.”261 The agency’s
settlements are negotiated outside of the public record and can be reached
at any time during the enforcement process.262
The SEC provides two central justifications for settlement, first being
that it avoids the risks of unexpected outcomes that might arise from
litigating a case. The agency considers the possibility that it might not
prevail at trial or that, even if it does prevail, a court might not grant all the
relief sought; thus it could end up obtaining less than what may be offered
in a proposed settlement.263 The SEC can and does lose at trial, and such
losses, particularly for novel cases, can affect its enforcement in the
future.264 By restraining itself to pursuing only winnable cases, the SEC
can purportedly have a stronger bargaining position during settlements
255
Anthony DiSarro, Six Decrees of Separation: Settlement Agreements and Consent Orders in
Federal Civil Litigation, 60 AM. U. L. REV. 275, 277–78 (2010). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
require all litigators, including those at the SEC, to sign any filed complaint and certify that they have a
reasonable basis for its claims supported by evidence. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b).
256
DiSarro, supra note 255, at 278.
257
Id. at 277–78.
258
Macchiarola, supra note 23, at 72.
259
Id. at 72–73.
260
SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 528 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing United States v. Armour & Co.,
402 U.S. 673, 681 (1971); Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 12 (1944); Swift & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 311, 325–26 (1928)).
261
Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 75 (prepared statement of Robert Khuzami,
Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement).
262
Macchiarola, supra note 23, at 78.
263
Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 75 (prepared statement of Robert Khuzami,
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265

based on such a reputation.
The second major justification is that settlement conserves agency
budgetary resources. It is common knowledge that litigation is both
resource and time intensive, and since trials often take longer to conclude
than settlements, it follows that the SEC would be able to investigate fewer
incidents if it focused exclusively on litigation.266 Settlements can preserve
the SEC’s scarce monetary and human resources, allowing it to have a
wider breadth of enforcement.267
By comparison to the financial institutions that the SEC is charged
with regulating, the agency is indisputably “under-funded and often legally
outgunned” as banks can employ several Wall Street law firms while the
agency’s annual budget is just a match for a single one of those firms.268
During fiscal year 2012, the SEC possessed only 3,785 full-time
employees,269 who collectively were responsible for regulating over 35,000
entities.270 The DOE Director stated in 2011 that the agency could only
inspect roughly eight percent of all investment advisers annually.271
Events like the funding freeze of 2011, which resulted in hiring freezes and
cut backs for activities such as travel for examiners, undoubtedly affected
the agency’s ability to enforce the U.S. markets.272 Ultimately, the SEC
does not have the staff or the funding to litigate every enforcement action,
and so it instructs SEC attorneys to prioritize cases that have significant
public policy ramifications in order to conserve resources.273 In 1973, at a
time when the SEC brought fewer actions than it does today, the Second
Circuit remarked that the agency could “bring the large number of
enforcement actions it does only because in all but a few cases consent
decrees are entered.”274
On the whole, these two major defenses of settlement revolve around
265
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money, which is largely an external force that the agency cannot fully
control since the size of its annual budget is set by Congress.275 But the
SEC does possess its own organizational and rule-making administrative
powers,276 and while the basic responses to funding shortfalls outlined
above are logical, it does not follow that the agency lacks any means or
freedom in how it actually deals with those challenges. Indeed, the root of
the Citigroup controversy arguably was planted from internal changes that
the SEC consciously and independently undertook in 1972 that continue to
significantly affect its settlement practices and case resolution decisionmaking to this day.
D. SEC Transformation
The first major change in 1972 was the elevation of the DOE from a
component within the SEC’s Division of Trading and Markets to its own
divisional-entity.277 Second, the agency issued a release on September 27,
1972, announcing it had decided to allow subjects under investigation an
opportunity to present their positions before an enforcement
authorization.278 The SEC “concluded that it would not be in the public
interest to adopt formal rules” and decided that such a presentation would
not be made a procedural right, but instead may be done on an “informal
basis.”279 The agency published related new informal rules supporting this
change in the Federal Register,280 and they are now part of the Code of
Federal Regulations.281 The shorthand descriptions for the various items in
this process are named after chairman John Wells, whose committee
recommended its adoption (e.g., alerting an investigation subject is called a
“Wells notice”).282
The SEC’s enforcement manual sets out specific guidelines relating to
Wells notices. The timing of issuing such a notice varies according to the
completeness of an investigation and if immediate enforcement action is
necessary; but, more importantly, it depends on whether approval has been
granted from an Associate or Regional Director.283 A Wells notice may
275
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276
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Release No. 5310, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Procedures Relating to the Commencement of
Enforcement Proceedings and Termination of Staff Investigations (Sept. 27, 1972), available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/enforce/wells-release.pdf.
279
Id.
280
37 Fed. Reg. 23,829 (Oct. 12, 1972).
281
17 C.F.R. § 202.5(c)–(d) (2013).
282
OFFICE OF CHIEF COUNSEL, supra note 209, at 22.
283
Id.

1144

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 46:1111

initially be given orally, but the SEC’s manual advises that it should be
followed by a written statement outlining the specific charges being
considered along with background and instructions setting out how a
recipient may respond.284 After receiving the notice, an investigation
target’s counsel can request a Wells meeting with staff to better understand
the allegations.285 Staff has the discretion to allow subjects to review nonprivileged portions of its investigative file.286
A written answer to a Wells notice is typically called a Wells
submission.287 Counsel use it to convince SEC staff to absolve or decrease
their client’s culpability or penalties by presenting mitigating
circumstances and highlighting factual deficiencies in their case, or by
sometimes offering a settlement.288 New facts are rarely introduced—
likely because respondents run the risk that their statements may be
discoverable and admissible in subsequent litigation.289 While presenting
their enforcement action recommendation to the Commissioners, SEC staff
will include any Wells submission along with a staff response to it, which
may include a position regarding any settlement offered.290
The last major development arising out of 1972 concerns the
codification of a practice that the SEC had adopted long before—allowing
defendants to neither admit nor deny the allegations of a consent decree.291
Since a denial from a defendant may lead to the false impression that
alleged conduct in a consent decree did not occur, the SEC’s codified rule
expressly prevents such denials and notes that “a refusal to admit the
allegations is equivalent to a denial, unless the defendant or respondent
states that he neither admits nor denies the allegations.”292 Nothing in the
rule requires that a defendant must admit allegations of wrongdoing as part
of a consent decree. The agency’s November 27, 1972 publication in the
Federal Register argued that this rule did not require public notice and
comment before taking effect.293
Evidently the SEC deemed it necessary to create this rule because
immediately after entry of consent decrees, defendants would frequently
engage in public campaigns denying the accusations and asserting that they
agreed to settle simply to avoid the expenses of protracted litigation.294
284
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Thus, the NAND rule represents a slight foundational enhancement to what
was already a common practice. If the SEC settles and allows a defendant
to neither admit nor deny the allegations, boilerplate language referencing
the agency’s rule is included in any consent judgments given to the
courts.295 In the past, DOE staff have threatened to rescind agreements if
any public denials are made, but the prompt issuance of retractions or
corrective press releases have generally been successful in preventing that
from actually happening.296
Throughout the past decade the SEC has issued policy statements that
supplement its original NAND rule. In 2003, it announced that all consent
injunction cases, including NAND, must have their allegations treated as
virtually conclusive for purposes of later disciplinary (i.e., suspension, bar,
or registration revocation) proceedings against the same individuals.297
Additionally, in 2012, the SEC stated that it would not allow defendants
who have already admitted guilt in parallel criminal proceedings from
entering into a NAND SEC settlement.298 Importantly, while the rule and
these policy changes curb public denials, defendants still possess the right
to deny allegations in other civil court proceedings such as in lawsuits
brought by harmed investors who may allege the same bad acts that were
alleged by the SEC.299
E. Effects of the Agency’s Modifications for Defendants
All in all, defense lawyers openly discuss the advantages of this
enforcement set-up and strategize to their clients’ benefit accordingly.
Defense attorneys describe the Wells process as “the most critical phase in
an SEC investigation,”300 and note that “the best opportunity to influence
the outcome of an SEC investigation often occurs during the staff’s
investigation, rather than after its completion.”301 The Wells process can
provide defendants a chance to review and comment on settlement

295
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documents, which gives defense counsel an opportunity to shape the
SEC’s conclusions and gain “substantial room” to negotiate the language
used in the agency’s complaint so that it contains a more neutral retelling
of the facts,303 and eliminates “some or all of a corporate defendant’s
employees from the charges.”304 Consequently, “SEC settlements have
long been ‘admired’ for their lack of factual basis.”305
Similar to the SEC, defendants value settlement as a means to avoid
risks associated with trial and to preserve time and resources (in terms of
money and personnel) for business development rather than litigation.306
An enforcement action alone generates negative publicity for an
institution.307 Attempting to litigate a matter across several news cycles
compounds the problem and thus is disfavored by comparison to a
situation where a complaint and settlement can be filed on the same day.308
Generally the market rewards settlements by raising the stock prices of a
company for at least a few days afterward because the deals remove
uncertainty.309
Arguably above all else, defendants value NAND SEC settlements for
removing the threat of collateral estoppel. Historically, only the same
parties in a particular case could collaterally estop the other in a subsequent
suit.310 This changed following Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore,311 when
the Supreme Court approved its use by a class action group against a
defendant who had an opportunity to fully and fairly litigate a prior action
brought by the SEC.312 The agency acted as amicus curiae during that case
and advocated for its final result.313 The takeaway from Parklane is that
defendants’ liability to private plaintiffs is practically guaranteed if they
lose an earlier SEC action that pertained to the same alleged illegal
activity.314
Settlements involving consent judgments generally do not have
collateral estoppel consequences because the issues involved are not
“actually litigated.”315 A consent judgment, however, may be conclusive if
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316

the parties manifest their intention for it to be so.
SEC NAND consent
judgments lack this requisite intent and so courts do not give them
preclusive effect.317
Ultimately defendants’ motivation to settle on a NAND basis makes
sense on a purely economic basis. Defendants frequently face far greater
potential monetary judgments from parallel private civil actions than from
any SEC action.318 In one astonishing example, Bank of America agreed to
a NAND settlement with the SEC for $150 million.319 Two years later, it
agreed to settle a class action suit related to the same matter that was
1520% more than the SEC amount ($2.43 billion)!320 Overall, it is
incontestable that defendants greatly benefit from the enforcement and
settlement process that the SEC has arranged.
F. Consequences of Changes on Private Suits by Harmed Investors
As implied by earlier discussions, securities laws provide investors
private causes of action to file certain civil suits individually or
collectively, by a class action, against violators.321 For example, persons
who purchase securities may recover for losses suffered if they can prove
that an issuer disclosed incomplete or inaccurate material information.322
Harmed investors attempting to use collateral estoppel bear the burden of
introducing a sufficient record of the prior proceeding in order for the trial
court to properly identify the issues already litigated.323
In instances when private plaintiffs must present their own case
without the benefit of collateral estoppel, it is important to first note certain
actions undertaken by the courts and Congress that have made it more
difficult for plaintiffs to get to trial. Although the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure require pleadings to merely contain “a short and plain statement
of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,”324 the Supreme
Court has held that plaintiffs must plead “factual content that allows the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged” in order to survive an opponent’s motion to
316
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dismiss.
To satisfy this heightened pleading standard, claims must have
“facial plausibility” which “asks for more than a sheer possibility that a
defendant has acted unlawfully.”326 “Threadbare recitals of the elements of
a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not
suffice.”327 “[P]laintiffs are not required to conform their pleadings to the
rules of evidence,”328 however, and allegations are sufficient if they can
“raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will reveal evidence.”329
But further complicating matters for harmed investors are conditions
imposed by the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
(“PSLRA”),330 which discourages the filing of weak or frivolous
lawsuits.331 It has been argued that the effect of PSLRA “leaves private
enforcement of the federal securities laws in near terminal condition.”332
Whereas under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allegations as to a
defendant’s state of mind may usually be “alleged generally,”333 PSLRA
imposes heightened pleading standards in actions brought under the
Exchange Act’s antifraud provisions. A private claimant must “state with
particularity facts giving rise to a strong inference that the defendant acted
with the required state of mind,”334 as well as “specify each statement
alleged to have been misleading, [and] the reason or reasons why the
statement is misleading.”335
If the SEC becomes involved in a matter, private plaintiffs can attempt
to guard their interests by moving to intervene in the agency’s enforcement
actions.336 But as a policy, the agency opposes outside third parties from
joining with its cases.337 However, plaintiffs can still benefit from the
SEC’s actions in other ways. For pleading purposes, plaintiffs may rely on
inadmissible evidentiary sources “including: confidential witnesses, news
articles, analyst reports, government hearing testimony (that was not
subject to cross examination), bankruptcy examiner reports, and even
325
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338

anonymous internet postings.”
SEC complaints are similar to those
items in that “there is no dispute that unadjudicated allegations are not
evidence and cannot be used to prove facts in a subsequently-filed action,
[but] such allegations may represent a source of factual information on
which other plaintiffs may reasonably rely at the pleading stage when
drafting their own complaints.”339
Ultimately, though private plaintiffs cannot collaterally estop
defendants merely by citing the content within government filings, the
factual allegations contained within those documents can be used to
provide foundational support in plaintiffs’ pleadings toward satisfying the
requirement that they will be able to prove their claims using other
admissible evidence following discovery.340 However, while plaintiffs
may cite government consent decrees, such references do not automatically
result in clearing the initial pleadings hurdle. Though many courts have
acknowledged “that specific factual allegations contained in a government
pleading may be more reliable as a source of factual information than
casual media reports,” there have been several instances when private
plaintiffs cited SEC complaints and their cases failed to advance.341 Thus,
when the SEC employs NAND settlements in cases like Citigroup, where
Judge Rakoff bemoaned the lack of “proven or admitted facts,”342 the
agency impairs the ability of private plaintiffs to proceed with their own
cases.
While the SEC today claims that it considers how its actions affect
private claims—for instance, taking into account, when making a
settlement determination, the fact that going to trial would delay the return
of funds to harmed investors343—historically the agency did not consider
such recoveries to be important.344 Also, recall that any funds collected by
the SEC merely constitute disgorgement and penalties, and since the
agency prevents joinder with its actions, compensatory damages to directly
remedy investor losses cannot be awarded by a court.345 Consequently, if
the agency truly worried about making investors whole, it might consider
how a NAND settlement affects private actions, specifically in denying
them the use of collateral estoppel. The DOE Director recently testified to
338
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339
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Congress, however, that the SEC does not consider those consequences.346
In defending the agency’s use of NAND, the SEC has argued that such
agreements “are common not just across federal financial agencies, but
across federal agencies more generally . . . . [i]n enforcing the securities,
antitrust, environmental, consumer protection, public health, and civil
rights laws.”347 At least two of those comparisons are disingenuous. First,
antitrust settlements are fundamentally different from the SEC process
because they incorporate interests beyond the immediate parties (i.e., the
agency and defendants). Before a court can approve an antitrust consent
judgment the parties are statutorily required to submit for judicial review a
detailed assessment of the settlement’s impact on third parties in the
general public.348 This competitive impact statement must include “the
remedies available to potential private plaintiffs damaged by the alleged
violation in the event that such proposal for the consent judgment is
entered in such proceeding.”349 Additionally, any proposed judgment must
be published in the Federal Register along with “any other materials and
documents which the United States considered determinative in
formulating such proposal,” allowing the public to comment for at least a
period of sixty days before the judgment may be entered.350 Second, the
environmental laws require publication of proposed settlements and
provide thirty days for the public to comment before a judge can enter a
consent decree.351 The SEC laws broadly discuss the “public interest” in
several places,352 but impose no analogous requirements of providing
notice to the public of settlements with opportunities to comment.
In sum, the confluence of the current law, rules, and policy decisions
have made investor loss recovery very difficult. The status quo, which the
SEC and defendants seem to prefer, is unfortunate because private lawsuits
arguably could supplement the agency’s enforcement and help to deter
future securities law violations. The remaining Parts of this Note will
explore whether and how the judiciary could bring about change to this
existing system.
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IV. ASSESSING THE USE AND UTILITY OF NAND SETTLEMENTS
A. The Role and Capabilities of the Judiciary
Since the founding of the United States, federal judges have been
valued for their impartiality. Alexander Hamilton identified the courts as
the “least dangerous” branch of government due to their detachment from
the normal electoral processes.353 Yet, while the American appointment
system affords federal judges a great amount of freedom, they would lack
authority entirely if the public had not initially granted the judiciary power
through the ratification of the Constitution.354 It is the public that sought
and continues to expect to this day a government of divided powers and
responsibilities.
When the SEC asks the courts to become its enforcement partner by
approving settlements in cases involving violations of securities laws and
regulations, the public has a significant interest that the operations of the
executive and the judiciary remain separate and independent. If the courts
merely rubber stamp a SEC consent judgment, they are not functioning in a
constitutional manner. This does not mean that the courts should outright
ban NAND agreements simply because they undermine private suits; to do
so would usurp the independence of the SEC. Instead the proper response,
as Judge Rakoff indicated in his Citigroup opinion, is to demand factually
credible and supported complaints so that the courts can properly fulfill
their role and conduct a neutral assessment of whether or not proposed
settlements are fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public interest.355
It is generally accepted that an agency’s decision whether and what to
prosecute is within its discretion and usually not reviewable.356 The
reasoning behind this conclusion is that since an agency conducted the
necessary investigation before filing charges and proposing a consent
judgment, it will generally have more prosecutorial expertise and access to
information than a court at the start of proceedings, and as such, judges
should provide agencies some deference for deciding to negotiate a

353
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357

settlement.
However, judges “can employ a number of measures to
lessen the impact of distributional inequalities.”358 These measures include
asking questions to supplement the parties’ presentation, calling their own
witnesses, and allowing outside parties to participate as amici.359
A judge’s role and participation in a settlement case will typically be
less than in one that goes to trial. Congress has established a strong public
policy encouraging settlement by requiring district courts to implement
plans that “ensure just, speedy, and inexpensive resolutions of civil
disputes.”360 For settlements, there is usually not much reason for a judge
to get heavily involved if the parties have reached a mutual agreement, and
courts are generally happy to embrace them for helping to clear their busy
dockets.361 Settlements that contain admissions of guilt have added
benefits for the courts, as collateral estoppel contributes to the conservation
of judicial resources by allowing courts to avoid re-litigating already
resolved issues.362
The courts have imposed certain common standards for reviewing and
approving injunctive relief. First, a prosecuting agency must prove a
defendant has violated the law and second, that he is likely to violate it
again in the future unless enjoined.363 The agency must show that the
threat of a future violation reasonably exists, and the courts assess this by
looking at the totality of the circumstances including the historical profile
of the defendant.364 Also among the factors that should be considered is
“the connection between the settlement and any related pending or
prospective criminal or civil cases.”365 Additionally, simply because
violative activity has ceased does not preclude a court from granting an
injunction.366
Assessing a case requires certain facts, and the general guideline from
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is that “[e]very order granting an
injunction . . . must: (A) state the reasons why it issued; (B) state its terms
specifically; and (C) describe in reasonable detail—and not by referring to
the complaint or other document—the act or acts restrained or required.”367
Along these lines courts have stated that “[b]ecause a consent judgment
has a continuing [e]ffect on the rights of litigants, courts are required to
357
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Id. at 666.
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Ochs et al., supra note 45, at 187.
364
Ferrara & Khinda, supra note 296, at 1175–76.
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ascertain whether the parties agreement ‘represents a reasonable factual
and legal determination based on the facts of the record.’”368 To gain the
requisite knowledge, a judge may conduct oral hearings and request
additional briefing.369
B. Development of Judicial Review for Securities Settlements
In concert with the basic tenant of reasonableness, courts over the
years have settled on a few additional terms to their standards of review for
assessing approval of SEC settlements: whether such agreements would
also be fair, adequate, and in the public interest.370 The four elements of
this test were arguably not consecutively combined until recently, but the
roots of it arose from SEC v. Randolph,371 in which the Ninth Circuit stated
that “[u]nless a consent decree is unfair, inadequate, or unreasonable, it
ought to be approved.”372 At issue in that case was whether the district
court correctly rejected a proposed NAND consent decree.373
The district court believed, because of the similarity in the purposes
behind an antitrust law and the securities laws, that it needed to review
whether the settlement was also in the “public’s best interest.”374 While
the Ninth Circuit reversed the judgment of the district court for going too
far by using a “best interest” standard,375 it wrote that “[w]e do not
question the appropriateness of a requirement that the decree be in the
public interest.”376 The Supreme Court has never directly commented on
whether courts must consider the public interest in the context of
approving consent decrees. But on two occasions in the past decade the
Court has required plaintiffs seeking injunctive relief to establish that such
an action was in the public interest.377
368
Bayou Fleet, Inc. v. Alexander, 234 F.3d 852, 858 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting United States v.
City of Miami, 664 F.2d 435, 441 (5th Cir. 1981) (en banc) (Rubin, J., concurring)).
369
FED. R. CIV. P. 78; see also Letter from Rudolf T. Randa, U.S. District Judge, to Andrea R.
Wood & James A. Davidson, Counsel (Dec. 20, 2011), available at http://www.wlrk.com/docs/Kosslett
er.pdf (requesting the SEC “provide a written factual predicate” to permit the court to assess the
proposed settlement).
370
E.g., SEC v. CR Intrinsic Investors, LLC, No. 12 CIV. 8466 (VM), 2013 WL 1614999, at *3
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 16, 2013); SEC v. Cioffi, 868 F. Supp. 2d 65, 72 (E.D.N.Y. 2012).
371
736 F.2d 525 (9th Cir. 1984).
372
Id. at 529.
373
Id. at 527–28; see also SEC. v. Randolph, 564 F. Supp. 137, 139 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (noting that
the defendants agreed to the consent decree “without conceding liability”), rev’d, 736 F.2d 525 (9th
Cir. 1984).
374
Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529.
375
Id. at 529–30.
376
Id. at 529.
377
See Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008) (“A plaintiff seeking a
preliminary injunction must establish . . . that an injunction is in the public interest.”); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (“According to well-established principles of equity,
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Despite this evolution in review standards, “[i]t is extremely rare for a
federal court to reject an SEC proposed settlement of an enforcement
action.”378 Going against the trend, Judge Rakoff has openly challenged
several SEC settlements presented to him when their structure or factual
basis failed to meet the accepted standard of review. First, in SEC v. Bank
of America Corp.,379 the SEC originally presented Judge Rakoff with a
proposed NAND consent judgment requesting to enjoin the bank and
impose a $33 million fine.380 The case related to the company’s
acquisition of Merrill Lynch and involved charges that Bank of America
lied to shareholders in its proxy statement that it would not pay $5.8 billion
Second, in SEC v. Vitesse
in bonuses to Merrill executives.381
Semiconductor Corp.,382 the SEC provided several NAND consent
judgments, one against the company and two against individuals,
containing various monetary penalties and either enjoinments or bars
concerning future activity.383 The case involved several allegations of
fraud occurring from 1995 to 2006, including the failure to record about
$184 million in compensation expenses.384
In each instance Judge Rakoff asked for a hearing and additional
materials.385 While considering each action, he noted the deference owed
to the SEC386 and that the final standard of review in each case was
whether the settlement was “fair, reasonable, adequate, and in the public
interest.”387 In Bank of America, without discussing the scope of review
concerning the public interest, Judge Rakoff assessed the facts behind the
proposed settlement and rejected it, concluding that “the proposed Consent
Judgment [was] neither fair, nor reasonable, nor adequate.”388 The parties
responded by presenting the court with “a 35-page Statement of Facts and
a plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy . . . that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.”).
378
Brief of Better Markets, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Pro Bono Counsel Appointed to
Advocate for Affirmance of the District Court’s Order, supra note 157, at 3 n.3.
379
653 F. Supp. 2d 507 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
380
Id. at 508.
381
Id.
382
771 F. Supp. 2d 304 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
383
Id. at 305, 307.
384
Id. at 305, 306.
385
Id. at 306; Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
386
Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 306–07; SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09
Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010); Bank of Am.
Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508.
387
Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 306–07; Bank of Am. Corp., 2010 WL
624581, at *3. Judge Rakoff phrased the standard slightly differently in his original Bank of America
decision. See Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 508 (“[T]he court is . . . obliged . . . to ascertain
whether [the proposal] is within the bounds of fairness, reasonableness, and adequacy—and, in certain
circumstances, whether it serves the public interest.”).
388
Bank of Am. Corp., 653 F. Supp. 2d at 509.
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a 13-page Supplemental Statement of Facts” along with “hundreds of
pages of deposition testimony and other evidentiary materials bearing on
the case” which Bank of America did not contest the accuracy of but
refused to concede on their materiality.389 Additionally the parties
presented a modified consent decree that added new prophylactic
measures, created a Fair Fund for harmed Bank of America shareholders,
and increased the fine to $150 million.390 Though Judge Rakoff bemoaned
that the fine was “paltry” and that the result would be “half-baked justice at
best,” he ultimately approved this new consent judgment, noting that it was
“premised on a much better developed statement of the underlying facts
and inferences drawn therefrom.”391
In Vitesse, Judge Rakoff argued that the SEC’s NAND rule creates a
“stew of confusion and hypocrisy,” making it difficult for the public to
discern the truth behind the agency’s actions.392 Unlike in Bank of
America though, Judge Rakoff was ultimately satisfied that the original
supplemental materials allowed the parties to meet the aforementioned
standard.393 Through the extra materials, he learned that though the
individual defendants were neither admitting nor denying the SEC’s civil
complaint, they had pleaded guilty to parallel criminal charges.394 Despite
the small $3 million fine, Judge Rakoff believed it to be adequate after
considering that the company already committed to providing $2.4 million
to a parallel class action suit, and both figures were less than the net cash
flow Vitesse took in that year ($1.5 million).395 In several ways, these two
cases laid the groundwork for the Citigroup case.
C. Surveying the SEC’s Reliance on and Effectiveness with NAND
Settlements
Underlying Judge Rakoff’s critiques of the SEC’s actions is a sense
that the agency uses its ability to reach NAND settlements as a shield to
avoid closer scrutiny of its policy choices and overall performance.
Although this Note agrees with the SEC that there are obvious case
resolution efficiencies and worthwhile resource preservation in settling, it
concludes that Judge Rakoff is correct to question the agency’s motives
and actions. A brief look at some of the agency’s recent enforcement
389

Bank of Am. Corp., 2010 WL 624581, at *1.
Id. at *3–5.
391
Id. at *4–6.
392
Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 308–09.
393
Id. at 306, 308.
394
Id. at 307. Notably, today those defendants would not have been allowed to enter into NAND
consent decrees. See supra text accompanying note 298 (noting that the SEC does not allow
“defendants who have already admitted guilt in parallel criminal proceedings from entering into a
NAND SEC settlement”).
395
Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d at 307, 310.
390
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statistics demonstrates that the agency has struggled to win cases at trial
and has adopted settlement as its default enforcement resolution.
For example, during the fiscal years 2010–2012, the agency brought an
average of about 717 enforcement actions a year,396 with 95% (roughly
685) of those cases ending through settlement.397 By comparison, other
agencies such as the Federal Trade Commission and Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission resolved their cases through settlement only 80%
of the time.398 The total number of SEC settlements through fiscal years
2003–2012 averaged about 726 annually.399 By contrast, the agency
brought no more than fifteen to twenty cases a year to trial in federal
court.400 The SEC claims it won between 82 and 86% of its trials during
2011 and 2012, but some commentators contend that the agency only wins
about half of its trials.401 Either figure is less than the Department of
Justice’s success rate of 90%.402
As to the effectiveness of its enforcement, the SEC has exhibited
difficulty in reacting to recidivists. Despite the presence of injunctions,
from 1996 to 2011 the largest Wall Street firms (including Bank of
America, Citigroup, Goldman Sachs, and JP Morgan Chase) collectively
repeated prior violations of anti-fraud securities laws at least fifty-one
times.403 These companies were allowed second chances to break the law
because the SEC granted at least 344 waivers during 2001–2011 to allow
those companies and their employees to continue their businesses.404
While the SEC has argued that NAND settlements “serve the critical
enforcement goals of accountability, deterrence, investor protection, and
396
See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2012 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT 2 (2012)
(announcing 734 enforcement actions); U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FY 2011 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 2 (2011) (announcing 735 enforcement actions); U.S. SEC. & EXCH.
COMM’N, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 11 (2010) (announcing 681
enforcement actions).
397
See JORGE BAEZ ET AL., NERA ECON. CONSULTING, SEC SETTLEMENT
TRENDS:
2H12
UPDATE
5
(2013),
available
at
http://www.nera.com/nerafiles/PUB_SEC_Trends_Update_2H12_0113_final.pdf (tallying 670 settlements in fiscal year 2010,
another 670 in 2011, and 714 in 2012).
398
Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 76–77 (prepared statement of Robert Khuzami,
Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement).
399
See BAEZ ET AL., supra note 397, at 5 (recording the total number of settlements for each year
during this period).
400
N.Y. CITY BAR ASSOC. COMM. ON SEC. LITIG., SEC V CITIGROUP 2 (2012), available at
http://www2.nycbar.org/pdf/report/uploads/20072297-SECv.Citigroup.pdf.
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Alison Frankel, The Stoker Verdict and the Citi Settlement, THOMPSON REUTERS (Aug. 2,
2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/us-citigroup-stoker-idUSBRE8711WL20120802.
402
Alison Frankel, No Easy Solution to Rakoff’s Challenge to SEC Settlements, THOMPSON
REUTERS (Nov. 3, 2011), http://newsandinsight.thomsonreuters.com/Legal/News/2011/11__November/No_easy_solution_to_Rakoff_s_challenge_to_SEC_settlements.
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Wyatt, supra note 83.
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Giving Wall Street a Break, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2
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405

compensation to harmed investors,”
this Note argues that such
settlements fail at all four levels. There cannot be true accountability if
defendants do not admit to liability. NAND settlements have generated
little, if any, positive deterrent effect as evidenced by the recent financial
calamities outlined in Part I, and by the number of repeat offenders as
detailed above. Additionally, they largely protect violators from harmed
investors rather than the other way around. Finally, investors can be only
partially compensated because, as discussed in Part III, the agency has a
policy against joinder, and the SEC alone does not have the power to
recover investor losses.
At the most basic level, NAND settlements are paradoxical. Why
would someone agree to be restrained if they refuse to admit any
wrongdoing? Along those lines, how can the SEC credibly argue that it
“settle[s] cases for the right reasons,” while at the same time admit that
“many companies would refuse to settle cases if they [were] required to
admit unlawful conduct.”406
In truth, corporate defense lawyers are much more afraid of lawsuits
initiated by private investors than they are of SEC actions. This fact is
manifested by companies’ preference for NAND settlements. Through the
Wells process, counsel can barter what their clients generally regard as
mere monetary pittances to avoid their client admitting liability and to
water down the factual clarity of the SEC’s complaints. Most frustrating
of all is that the SEC recognizes this desire and, all too commonly, gives
away the NAND bargaining chip. The SEC’s current co-director of the
DOE recently commented that “[a]s a defense lawyer, I always clearly
wanted from [sic] my clients no admit and no deny settlements.”407
On a strictly case-by-case basis, the argument for settling—to avoid
litigation risks and conserve resources—is strong. However, when viewed
in the aggregate, such decisions appear less thoughtful and deliberate, and
instead demonstrate routine and predictable behavior. It is true that
settlement frees up the SEC’s staff to investigate and bring more cases.
But if the SEC’s opponents know and expect that it will settle, then the
agency has lost a significant amount of negotiating power when it comes to
drafting settlement agreements and this leads to the creation of factually
diluted court filings and a reduction in the penalties imposed against
defendants. One commentator made an apt observation that “[w]hen it
complains, even legitimately, about its budget or how costly and difficult
trials are, the S.E.C. is inadvertently showing its belly to Wall Street in a

405
Settlement Practices Hearing, supra note 12, at 75 (prepared statement of Robert Khuzami,
Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, Division of Enforcement).
406
Khuzami, supra note 10.
407
SEC’s Andrew Ceresney Defends Neither Admit nor Deny Settlements, supra note 299.
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408

sign of submission.”
Not surprisingly, the agency’s overall performance and clear
overreliance on settlement has drawn widespread public criticism, and its
thinly supported complaints and consent decrees have garnered
admonishment from the federal courts. The agency has tried to defend
itself by repeatedly presenting certain straightforward figures in its annual
reports, such as the number of actions brought and amount of money
recovered, to provide a counterargument that in fact its enforcement is
robust and substantial.409 The DOE Director once framed the agency’s
performance by comparing its 2010 and 2011 combined budgets of $2.3
billion against a total penalty recovery of $5.6 billion during that period as
delivering a return on investment that “[v]ery few companies can claim.”410
While such figures may sound impressive on their own, the exorbitant
recovery figures could demonstrate an insecure market just as much as a
tightly regulated one. Working in favor of the former argument is the fact
that the SEC has been able to accumulate larger collections simply because
the legal reforms during the past twenty years have facilitated it. In
support of this contention, in 2009 alone, the agency distributed $2.1
billion, which was twice as much as it had collected between 1984 and
1992 all together.411 Notably the largest penalty the SEC had ever obtained
up until the 2002 passage of Sarbanes-Oxley was just $10 million.412
Beyond monetary penalties, the agency could do more concerning
recidivists, but it has not. Recall Citigroup’s repeated violations presented
in Part II.B and the fact that the SEC did not present those charges in any
detail during the Citigroup case.
Michigan Senator Carl Levin
appropriately commented that the SEC’s settlement practices are “like a
cop giving out warnings instead of giving tickets . . . . [i]t’s a green light to
operate the same way without a lot of fear that the boom is going to be
lowered on you.”413
In a welcome new development, SEC Chairman Mary Jo White
announced in June 2013 that the SEC would require an admission of guilt
for certain cases in the future.414 However, as of February 2014, the
agency has neither published new rules to effectuate such a policy change,
nor eliminated the NAND rule. Based on the SEC’s decades-long track
408
Jesse Eisinger, Needed: A Cure for a Severe Case of Trialphobia, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 14,
2011), http://www.propublica.org/thetrade/item/needed-a-cure-for-a-severe-case-of-trialphobia.
409
E.g., U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FISCAL YEAR 2012 AGENCY FINANCIAL REPORT, supra
note 396, at 2.
410
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411
Zimmerman, supra note 234, at 529 30.
412
MacDonald, supra note 11, at 425.
413
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414
Jenna Greene, At the SEC, No Admit, No Deny Lives On, BLOG LEGAL TIMES (Sept. 17, 2013,
3:21 PM), http://legaltI chaimes.typepad.com/blt/2013/09/at-the-sec-no-admit-no-deny-lives-on.html.
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record, the public should not put too much faith in the notion that the SEC
has permanently changed without evidence of more substantive steps or
regular denial of NAND agreements.
V. A WAY FORWARD THROUGH THE JUDICIARY
This Note has examined how NAND settlements afford violators of
securities laws two great benefits: the opportunity to shroud their illegal
actions from the public and time to delay the completion of private actions
filed by harmed investors. To remedy the ineffectiveness of the current
enforcement system, this Note contends that judges should be the engine
for introducing much needed change. The vehicle for change, as Judge
Rakoff surveyed in the Citigroup case, is the application of a public
interest component when courts review SEC requests for injunctive relief.
While the SEC has argued that it is most capable of assessing the
public interest,415 courts should not automatically defer to the agency.
Though the SEC is tasked with protecting investors and the markets in a
broad way that arguably encompasses the entire public, its enforcement
powers do not fully align with the scope of its mission. Because it cannot
fully recover harmed investors’ losses,416 it cannot provide complete
protection for them. Thus the U.S. securities enforcement system is
splintered between two segments: public and private enforcement. Judges
must not ignore this important fact.
Though the advent of Fair Funds may increase the agency’s support for
the interests of harmed investors, the SEC arguably puts its self-interest
above those of all outside parties when it determines whether to reach a
NAND settlement. It does not adequately consider the cost to specifically
harmed investors (and indirectly to the public at large) of failing to require
defendants to admit liability so they can be collaterally estopped from
arguing their innocence in civil court. The SEC in the past has made a
duplicitous argument that harmed investors are better served by a quick
settlement rather than waiting longer for results from a trial.417 Framing
settlements as something that harmed investors desire hides the ignoble
fact that the agency controls the process and prefers to settle for the myriad
internal reasons discussed earlier. Ultimately, by using NAND agreements
that weaken private investor suits, the SEC makes it more difficult to
accomplish its principal purpose of maintaining fair and transparent
security exchanges. It undermines the opportunity for private suits to
415
See Brief of the Securities & Exchange Commission, Appellant/Petitioner, supra note 171, at
19 (“The district court did not defer to the Commission’s decision . . . . [which] reflected the
Commission’s judgment that settlement best served the public interest . . . .”).
416
See supra Part III.B.
417
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provide added accountability and deterrence.
Admittedly the SEC’s job is difficult, but it does not follow that its
policy decisions cannot be questioned by other branches of government or
the public. While pushing for more admissions of guilt should be
complimented, regardless of what the SEC may do going forward, the
judiciary must fulfill its obligations of providing meaningful review that
acknowledges the agency’s biases. When dealing with cases involving
government action, the judiciary has a duty to consider the entire public
interest in a much broader sense than the narrow interests of any parties
that come before it.
To meet that duty this Note argues that the current four-element
standard of review should be fleshed out to assist judges in their
evaluations as well as set clear expectations for settling parties (i.e., the
SEC and defendants). Toward establishing this new framework, the
lessons surrounding the Bank of America, Vitesse, and Citigroup cases are
incorporated. Centrally, Judge Rakoff’s exhortation in Citigroup of
needing “proven or admitted facts” is a fundamental component.418 Such
facts do not dictate admitting liability but merely demonstrate that there is
sufficient proof for a judge to determine that the settlement satisfies all
four elements of the standard of review.
Proceeding through each part of the standard of review, I argue that
judges should first analyze a consent decree against the public interest. To
begin, if any third parties have been harmed by the alleged violations, this
should be acknowledged in the SEC filings because it will affect the next
steps of analysis. Courts should segregate cases where defendants admit
fault from others where they do not. When liability is conceded, the public
interest is generally satisfied. However, as is the case for NAND
settlements, more careful scrutiny under the remaining three elements will
be needed to sufficiently account for the public being denied clear
accountability and the fact that the courts and harmed investors will likely
have to undertake longer private litigation as a result. Such an imposition
can be weighed against whether the SEC has committed to making a Fair
Fund available to provide restitution.
The next element, concerning whether a settlement is fair, is relatively
narrow and focuses on whether the agreement was fairly reached between
the parties involved. Specifically, the inquiry under this element is
whether the agreement was completed by an arm’s length negotiation and
whether each party consented to the agreement without coercion. The
terms of the settlement should be clear and unambiguous to any defendants
or outside observers.
The third element calls on a judge to analyze the charges and the proof
418
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provided to determine whether they are reasonable. The most basic
inquiry is whether the agency and the court have the authority to impose
the terms set out in the consent decree. For instance, it would be
unreasonable for the SEC to charge a defendant for violating an
environmental statute if the power to do so had not been delegated to the
agency. On a more substantive level though, a judge must assess whether
the SEC has provided a satisfactory factual basis that is sufficiently
consistent with the legal requirements for the violations asserted.
The court should not reject a consent decree on a basis that the SEC
could or should have charged a defendant under a different law. This
would interfere with the executive branch’s independence in deciding how
it proceeds with a case and would ignore the fact that each side in a
negotiation will logically tend to give up something in return for an
agreement. However, as Judge Rakoff did in Bank of America, Vitesse,
and Citigroup, courts should compare any complaint against parallel civil
or criminal proceedings to ensure that the facts presented are consistent
across each.419 Courts may dismiss an agreement if there are significant
ambiguities, material gaps, or inconsistencies that would prevent it from
undertaking a meaningful review. This was the case in Citigroup, where
there were questions concerning the mental state of CGMI’s actions and
the gross gain achieved.420
The final element, adequacy, is arguably the most complex part of a
court’s review and requires significant factual support. When third parties
in the public have been harmed by a violation, the courts should assess
NAND settlements differently from non-NAND ones. Since NAND
agreements prevent collateral estoppel, judges should compare the
adequacy of a settlement’s terms against both the defendant’s gross gain
and any purported losses by injured investors. Thus, it should be a
prerequisite that the parties to a NAND settlement provide the courts with
those two amounts as well as the means to adequately explain and
substantiate how the parties arrived at their figures. By contrast, a nonNAND settlement should not consider investor losses because those
persons would benefit from the liability admission. The mix of any
financial penalty, between the amount of fines and disgorgement, should
be largely immaterial since both are combined for Fair Fund purposes.
Unfortunately, an exact equation for measuring a settlement’s
adequacy cannot be formulated—but certain variables can be used to assist
judges in their determinations. Centrally, the quality of detail presented in
the parties’ filings should carry significant weight because any and all facts
419
Id. at 329–30; SEC v. Vitesse Semiconductor Corp., 771 F. Supp. 2d 304, 307–08 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); SEC v. Bank of Am. Corp., Nos. 09 Civ. 6829 (JSR), 10 Civ. 0215 (JSR), 2010 WL 624581, at
*2 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 22, 2010).
420
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outlined could benefit the private claims of harmed investors and, most
importantly, could provide warnings and transparency to the general public
and the courts about who specifically committed the alleged illegal
activities and how. There may be instances where a $285 million NAND
agreement reached to settle almost $1.2 billion in combined gross gains
and investor losses should be ruled inadequate because of the poor quality
of the facts supporting it. But another NAND settlement for just $150
million against $5.8 billion in total gross gains and investor losses could be
ruled adequate due to the unambiguousness of the evidence presented.
Alternatively, a third NAND settlement for $298 million to resolve $300 in
combined gross gains and investor losses could be adequate even with
minimal factual support because of how close the remedy financially
covers the harm caused. Finally, a non-NAND settlement for $15 million
against $400 million in total gross gains and investor losses sustained by a
minimum number of facts could be adequate because of the admission of
guilt.
Toward assessing the adequacy of a financial penalty against the facts
presented, penalties should not be judged by how easily a company might
be able to cover any monetary penalties. Cases like Vitesse, however,
where a defendant company is constrained by the amount it could pay
back,421 may change the analysis due to that type of extenuating
circumstance. Yet a judge should analyze the size and scope of a
settlement against a defendant’s past behavior comparing relevant past
penalties imposed on that same individual or entity (regardless if the
parties identify such penalties in the present filings or not). Judges may be
tempted to, but they should not compare penalties that were previously
imposed on another party against the company or individual that is
presently before it (e.g., comparing Bank of America against Citigroup)
because it is different to compare past settlements made involving the same
company versus settlements made with another that entail distinct facts and
players.
Lastly, as it relates to the injunction component of consent decrees,
judges should be notified if the defendant individual or company has been
or is subject to any relevant post-violation compliance procedures. Judges
should evaluate the effectiveness of those past measures and insure that
adequate supervision or new procedures will be established to prevent
future violations.
VI. CONCLUSION
In the present era of economic instability, private securities actions
could play a crucial, complementary role in providing accountability and
421
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deterring illegal activities in the markets, and the courts should give this
more consideration in their standard of review. Judges can effectively
make sure that the public interest is being considered even if the SEC
falters at times in its enforcement. This Note’s proposed course of review
does not allow judges to insert themselves in crafting the scope of SEC
settlements, but instead simply pushes the agency to be clearer in how it
has developed them.
The agency should not be burdened by this type of judicial review. As
outlined in Part III.A, considering the time spent investigating cases as
well as the level of internal review, it is safe to assume that if the SEC
presents a court with an enforcement action, then it has, at the very least,
built a robust evidentiary record that it could deploy if needed. There is no
good reason why the agency could not provide other types of materials
such as “a verified complaint, an SEC affidavit, a joint statement of facts,
record evidence like depositions or documents, a 21(a) report of
investigation from the SEC, or any number of other ways”422 if it were
asked by a court for additional information beyond its initial filings.
Defendants may benefit less from this proposal, but this may not be an
undesirable result. In agreeing to NAND settlements, violators of
securities laws have already earned a tremendous litigation asset by
denying harmed investors the option of collateral estoppel, but it is curious
why it would be in the public interest for them to double their benefits by
profiting from factually diluted government filings that make it harder for
private claims to be brought against them. Though private plaintiffs would
benefit from clearer submissions, government allegations would merely
advance harmed investors to the next stage of litigation and would not
guarantee victory to them or leave settling violators defenseless. Private
claimants would still need to prove their allegations based on admissible
evidence.
This proposed framework will lead to a more transparent and balanced
system. It should allow continued SEC discretion in determining how it
resolves its investigations, provide courts more sufficient information to
fulfill its review responsibilities, and offer greater resources to the public to
identify, understand, and possibly assist in deterring bad actors from
committing future violations.
If the SEC presents Citigroup-like
settlements in the future, courts should follow the example set by Judge
Rakoff by giving the agency an opportunity to provide further information,
and, in the absence of any substantial updates, can reject them if they fail
to meet the standard of review.
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Brief of Better Markets, Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of Pro Bono Counsel Appointed to
Advocate for Affirmance of the District Court’s Order, supra note 157, at 4.

